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This resource is from the final Report of the Morris Inquiry. This section contains chapter 2, "Pathway to Change". This chapter deals with the Inquiry's work, the MPS, governance, policing London, the employment status of police officers and police staff, and the need for change.

Sections available here:

• 2: Pathway to Change
  • Chapter Summary
  • The Inquiry’s work
  • The Metropolitan Police Service
  • Governance
  • Policing London
  • The employment status of police officers and police staff
  • The need for change

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2: Pathway to Change

“The primary function of a constable is the preservation of the Queen’s Peace.”
Christopher Fox, President of ACPO

Chapter Summary

This chapter deals with:

• The Inquiry’s work
• The Metropolitan Police Service
• Governance
• Policing London
• The employment status of police officers and police staff
  • The office of constable
  • The employment status of police officers
  • The employment status of police staff
• The need for change

The Inquiry’s work

2.1 The Inquiry was commissioned by the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) and its remit was to inquire into professional standards and employment matters in the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS). We were asked to focus, in particular, on the MPS’ policies, procedures and practices for handling complaints and allegations against individuals, grievances and workplace disputes, as well as Employment Tribunal claims. We were also asked to identify lessons to be learnt from recent high profile cases.

2.2 It was a challenging task and our evidence gathering process lasted for over six months. We received in excess of 1,400 documents and heard extensive oral evidence. A wide range of stakeholders contributed to our work. These included the Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner and other senior officers in the MPS, as well as the MPA itself.

2.3 We also heard from the Police Federation (National and Metropolitan), the Trades Unions operating in the MPS, the National and Metropolitan Black Police Associations, other staff associations operating in the MPS, a number of national bodies, other public sector organisations, and the private sector.

2.4 We are grateful to them all but we are particularly grateful to those individuals who took the time to share their experiences with us. We have anonymised their contributions and they appear either as IND 1–51 or as Mr/Ms AA–PP. Individuals in the latter category gave oral evidence at one of our hearings.

2.5 We are grateful for the Commissioner’s personal support for our work, his encouragement to all MPS personnel that they should co-operate with the Inquiry and his determination “that the inquiry will contribute to a different MPS – one that is better able to meet the challenges of policing a complex modern society.” We hope that this report lives up to his confidence that “lasting improvements to policing in London and to the reputation of the Service will result.”

2.6 We have been out on patrol with officers from Lambeth Borough Operational Command Unit, visited 14 London police stations, the Hendon Training Centre, New Scotland Yard and other central London MPS buildings, as well as spending a day each with Greater Manchester Police, Merseyside Police and West Midlands Police. We found those visits invaluable and would place on record our thanks to all those who worked so hard to make them a success.

2.7 We were extremely impressed by the professionalism and commitment of all those we met and their obvious pride in their work. We would like to endorse the words of Commander Stephen Allen of the MPS Diversity Directorate: “Thousands of times each day members of this organisation step into moments of crisis or difficulty in people’s lives and respond with compassion and professionalism. Officers consistently risk their lives in pursuit of a more ordered society and suffer abuse and violence on behalf of the people of London.”

2.8 Time after time people came before us, sometimes with harrowing experiences to relate, but always expressing a pride in being a member of the MPS.

2.9 We also carried out a survey of all the officers and staff in the MPS to get their views on some of the issues we were considering. We would like to thank the 16,000 officers and staff who took the time to respond to the survey and give us their views.

2.10 We have one regret. The MPS sought contributions from officers and staff with the intention of making an organisational submission to our Inquiry, based on the experiences of individuals. Ultimately the decision was taken not to make such a submission. The MPS have told us that there was never “any intention to deprive individuals of their opportunity to contribute to the Inquiry’s work”. We accept this but, however, the fact remains that a number of individuals provided material for that corporate submission and we regret that the Inquiry was not able to benefit from the messages that those individuals wished us to receive.

2.11 We were asked to focus on the policies, procedures and practices of the MPS. However, it soon became clear that how the MPS deals with complaints, allegations against individuals and workplace conflicts could not be seen in isolation from the other 42 police services in England and Wales. There is a national framework for police complaints and discipline matters which is not a matter for local discretion. In addition, a number of key policies governing the management of officers and staff derive from statutory obligations or national policies. The Fairness at Work policy is but one example.

2.12 Therefore, much of what we say in this report is of wider application than the MPS and, if accepted, many of our recommendations would have a national impact.

The Metropolitan Police Service

2.13 The MPS was formed in 1829. It was the first organised police service in London. Today the MPS is responsible for policing almost all of Greater London. (The City of London Police, British Transport Police and Royal Parks’ Constabulary also have responsibilities for policing parts of London.)

2.14 The people resources available to the MPS consist of approximately 30,000 police officers and 14,000 police staff (formerly referred to as civilian support staff) with numbers increasing. The MPS represents 20 per cent of policing in England and Wales and has an annual budget in excess of £2.5 billion.

2.15 Until the year 2000, there was no police authority for London. That role was discharged by the Home Secretary. However, in 1999, the Greater London Authority Act created the Greater London Authority (GLA) and its ‘functional bodies’, one of which was the new Metropolitan Police Authority.

Governance

2.16 “No one person is in overall control of policing in England and Wales. The current governance arrangement which involves chief officers of police, police authorities and the Home Secretary – what is known as the ‘tripartite arrangement’ – has evolved over time, based on the broad principles of political impartiality of the police, policing by consent of the public, the Government’s overall responsibility for ensuring a safe society in which to live, and the need for the expenditure of public money to be properly accounted for.”
(Home Office, Building Safer Communities Together, 2003.)

2.17 Briefly, the roles of each element of the ‘tripartite arrangement’ are as follows:

• Chief Constables of Police (this includes the Commissioner) are responsible for the ‘direction and control’ of their service. They are responsible for operational decisions and the day to day running of their service.
• Police authorities are responsible for ensuring there is an ‘efficient and effective’ police service for their area and holding the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) and service to account for how well they deliver local policing. They are responsible for appointing chief officers and have specific responsibilities, including consulting with communities, publishing three year service strategy plans and annual local policing plans and setting the annual budget for their service.
• The Home Secretary is answerable to Parliament and the public for the provision of an efficient and effective police service. The Home Secretary sets out the Government’s strategic priorities for policing in the National Policing Plan and has a role in helping to drive up police performance and addressing poor performance. It is the Home Secretary’s responsibility to determine the total level of grant for policing and its allocation to police authorities, using a funding formula.

2.18 The MPA came into existence in July 2000. It is the first police authority for London. Previously the MPS was only accountable to the Home Secretary.

“For the first time in its 175 years history, the Metropolitan Police Service is accountable to Londoners, open to scrutiny, and required to answer for its performance in public.”
(Submission from Lord Harris, former Chair of the MPA.)

2.19 The MPS is also accountable to the Home Secretary, and other important stakeholders include the Mayor of London, the GLA and the 32 London boroughs.

“I think, chairman, I am on record as saying I am the most accountable police chief in the world. Of that there is no doubt. If one looked at the number of bodies one is accountable to, and I make no complaint about this … I think there is something in the region of 22/26 bodies that I am accountable to.”
(Evidence of the Commissioner, Sir John Stevens.)

2.20 The MPA has the same duties and powers in relation to the oversight of policing as all other police authorities in England and Wales. Specifically, the Authority’s functions are to:

• increase community confidence and trust in London’s police service;
• secure continuous improvement in the way policing is provided;
• publish an Annual Policing Plan in consultation with London’s communities;
• set policing targets and monitor performance regularly against those targets;
• be accountable for the management of the police budget;
• agree the annual costed Human Resources plan and the priorities for training;
• oversee the appointment and discipline of senior police officers; and
• oversee formal inquiries and the implementation of their recommendations.

2.21 Other police authorities appoint their Chief Constable, subject only to the approval of the Home Secretary. In London, the Queen formally appoints the two most senior officers, the Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, on the recommendation of the Home Secretary, who must have regard to the recommendations made by the MPA. Other chief officers – the ‘ACPO ranks’ – are appointed by the MPA.

2.22 In addition, other police authorities set their own budget and precept upon the relevant local authorities that raise the local element of the council tax. In London, under the 1999 Act, the MPA prepares an annual budget for policing London and submits it to the Mayor, who has the responsibility for setting the budget in conjunction with the Greater London Assembly. The Mayor then precepts on the boroughs for the element that is payable from local council tax.

2.23 The Commissioner is responsible for the ‘direction and control’ of the MPS and, in discharging that function, must have regard to the Annual Policing Plan, published by the MPA, and to any guidance or code of practice issued by the Home Secretary.

2.24 Thus the Commissioner has full responsibility for all operational matters, and for the management of the Service, although not for appointing his top team. He or she is expected to account to the MPA for the performance of the Service.

2.25 The MPA can require the Commissioner to submit reports on matters connected with the policing of London. He also has to comply with regulations made by the MPA governing financial administration and procurement. These delegate responsibilities exercisable by the MPA with appropriate financial limits.

“I think it is very easy to say that the Met is overregulated and overaccountable, but the reality is that the formal lines of accountability and regulation are fairly clear, and these are the same for any police service, whether it is a small county or the Metropolitan Police. There is an accountability to the Police Authority, and there is an accountability to the Home Office. Now in London, yes, there is the Mayor, yes, there is the GLA, but their responsibilities are limited, and the prime line of accountability is with the Police Authority.”
(Evidence of Lord Harris, former Chair of the MPA.)

Policing London

2.26 As Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) has recognised, the challenge of policing London is much more than simply the challenge of policing a major capital city:

“The task of policing London is more immense than its size and as complex as the atypical makeup of its resident, commuter and visitor population. Those who argue that scale and size are the only factors of policing difference have failed to comprehend the strategic and day-to-day complexity of policing the capital. It is the view of Her Majesty’s Inspectors that, in policing terms, London is both distinct and different.”
(Policing London: ‘Winning Consent’, 2000.)

2.27 As well as the policing issues which might be expected in a large city, the changing profile of London’s communities presents a particular challenge. Policing in this country is founded on consent and the MPS cannot win the battle against crime without gaining the trust and confidence (and thus the consent) of all the diverse communities it serves.

2.28 In addition, the capital is the focus for many ceremonial and large public order events. These range from the regular events – Remembrance Sunday, the Trooping of the Colour, the State Opening of Parliament, the Notting Hill Carnival – to the unusual, such as the Queen’s Golden Jubilee in 2002, the ‘Stop the War’ march in 2003, President Bush’s visit in the same year and the rugby world champions’ victory parade.

2.29 The MPS is renowned the world over for its expertise in this area and for the success with which it balances the efficient and effective management of events, with security issues and the rights of individuals to express dissent or simply enjoy themselves. Since 2001, the increased threat of terrorist attack on London and the consequent need for heightened security measures have tested this expertise even further.

2.30 Other notable examples in recent years include:

• major counter-terrorism operations;
• Operation Trident, dealing with gun crime in the capital, and Operation Trafalgar, dealing with non-fatal shootings;
• Operation Emerald, expanding case progression and victim and witness support units across London;
• Operation Bumblebee, tackling burglaries:
• Operation Blunt, to rid London streets of knives; and
• Project Sapphire, improving rape investigation and victim care.

2.31 The MPS thus has an enviable track record for operational success and we concur with words used by the Commissioner in his submission to us “… the MPS has a proud history of achievement and responding to a changing society.”

2.32 However, the evidence we have received suggests that it has less of a track record for dealing with workplace issues and responding to the changing needs of its workforce. We will reflect on what we have heard later in this report. We hope that our recommendations will help the MPS to be as good at managing its own officers and staff as it is at keeping London safe.

The employment status of police officers and police staff

2.33 Anyone familiar with policing in this country will know that police officers and police staff are treated differently from other workers in a number of important respects regarding employment rights. However, those who do not have a detailed knowledge of how the police service works will perhaps be surprised to learn that police officers are not employees and do not enjoy the same basic rights as the vast majority of workers in the United Kingdom.

2.34 Police officers do not, for example, have a right to claim unfair dismissal in an Employment Tribunal and matters of discipline are regulated by a statutory framework, most recently the Police Reform Act 2002 and the regulations made under that statute.

2.35 It is worth looking at this in some detail as the employment status of police officers and the differences between officers and police staff require closer scrutiny and will be the subject of detailed recommendations in this report. They are also the starting point for many other recommendations.

The office of constable

2.36 Every police officer, of all ranks up to and including Chief Constable, is an office holder under the Crown. Police officers are not employees of the Chief Constable (the Commissioner) or the police authority, nor are they Crown servants (although this latter description is often mistakenly used).

2.37 The status of office holder is more commonly associated with holding high civic office, for example as a judge. Officers acquire the authority and status of constable by attestation, that is, swearing an oath pledging to serve the Queen, uphold human rights, preserve the peace and prevent crime.

“The primary function of a constable is the preservation of the Queen’s Peace. From this general function stem a number of particular duties … For example, the first duty of a constable is to prevent the commission of a crime and if they reasonably apprehend that the action of any person may result in a breach of the peace it is their duty to prevent that action.”
(Submission from Christopher Fox, President of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).)

2.38 Additional functions are conferred by statute. Furthermore, when a police officer is carrying out his or her duties, he or she is not acting under a delegated authority, but an original authority.

2.39 Clearly this broad range of duties and the special status of police officers can bring individual constables into conflict with the public in a variety of situations and are the prime reasons for the need for an open, transparent and independent system for public complaints.

2.40 The potential for complaints from members of the public also means that any system for dealing with such complaints must, so far as is possible, contain safeguards to protect officers who are carrying out their duties in a conscientious manner.

The employment status of police officers

2.41 It is important to bear in mind that the Police Regulations which set out the terms and conditions of officers and the disciplinary framework were born out of the industrial unrest of the 19th and early 20th century.

2.42 The first regulations were drawn up in 1920 and were made under the Police Act 1919, which was enacted in the wake of the strike of 1918. They gave police officers rights which were in advance of those enjoyed by other workers at that time and put the police service in the vanguard of industrial relations.

2.43 However, industrial relations and employment rights have developed significantly in the last 40 years with the establishment of Industrial Tribunals (now Employment Tribunals), the introduction of written terms and conditions of employment for employees, statutory employment rights and legislation on equalities, health and safety, etc. European legislation has also had the effect of strengthening rights conferred by English law.

2.44 Therefore ‘ordinary’ employees have, it could be argued, ‘caught up with’ and indeed overtaken police officers by gaining the benefit of written contracts and a number of statutory rights.

2.45 The position of police officers has, of course, not remained static as, incrementally, they have been subject to a wide range of legislation benefiting ‘ordinary’ employees. Police officers are today covered by:

• Equal Pay Act 1970;
• Health & Safety at Work Act 1974;
• Sex Discrimination Act 1975;
• The Race Relations Act 1976;
• Disability Discrimination Act 1995;
• Human Rights Act 1998;
• Working Time Regulations 1998;
• Part-time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable) Treatment Regulations 2000;
• Employment Act 2002;
• Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003; and
• Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.

2.46 The rights conferred by these legislative provisions have served to enhance the rights of police officers in some circumstances and have not proved to be inconsistent with their status as office holders under the Crown.

2.47 Under the previous police complaints and discipline regime of the Police Act 1996, the following regulations governed the relevant procedures:

• Police (Complaints) (Mandatory Referrals) Regulations 1985;
• Police (Anonymous, Repetitious etc Complaints) Regulations 1985;
• Police (Complaints) (Informal Resolution) Regulations 1985;
• Police (Complaints) (General) Regulations 1985;
• Police (Complaints) (General) (Amendment) Regulations 1988;
• Police (Dispensation from Requirement to Investigate Complaints) Regulations 1990;
• (Police Appeals) Tribunal Rules 1999;
• Police (Efficiency) Regulations 1999;
• Police (Conduct) Regulations 1999;
• Police (Conduct) (Senior Officers) Regulations 1999; and
• Police (Efficiency) (Amendment) Regulations 2003.

2.48 Under the new regime created by the Police Reform Act 2002, which came into force on 1st April 2004, the following regulations already have effect:

• Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004;
• Police (Conduct) Regulations 2004;
• Independent Police Complaints Commission (Transitional Provisions) Order 2004; and
• Independent Police Complaints Commission (Transitional Provisions) (Amendment) Order 2004.

The length of these lists carries a message of its own.

2.49 It is worth remembering that the philosophy behind the regime governing police disciplinary matters has its origins in military discipline. As John Wadham, Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), said to us in evidence, “… the history of the discipline process seems to be in parallel with the kind of militaristic courts martial, which, of course, is not about modern management practice.”

2.50 The disciplinary regime for police officers involves the same process whether the issue under investigation is a public complaint or an internal allegation of misconduct. Therefore workplace issues, which elsewhere might be dealt with under an internal disciplinary system (for example, irregularities in mileage claims, sexual harassment, etc.) are subjected to the same process as a complaint from a member of the public about the conduct of an officer whilst engaged in active policing. A version of this system has applied for over 80 years.

2.51 The police complaints system was first codified under the Police Act 1964. The Police Act 1976 established the Police Complaints Board (PCB), with powers to scrutinise investigation reports, and first introduced the double jeopardy protection for police officers.

2.52 Thereafter, the system was subjected to periodic reform, with incremental rather than fundamental change. Each new statute was accompanied by a number of underlying regulations outlining the various procedures within the system and any differences, where appropriate, for senior officers.

2.53 The PCB was ultimately superceded by the Police Complaints Authority (PCA), which was created by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The PCA had additional powers to supervise police investigations. There was also accompanying secondary legislation which introduced a discipline code for police officers, and outlined a procedure for the informal resolution of complaints.

2.54 The Police Act 1996 consolidated a number of legislative provisions relating to the police and abolished the double jeopardy rule. New conduct regulations followed in 1999.

2.55 The most significant changes resulting from the 1999 Regulations were the reduction from a criminal to a civil standard of proof in certain disciplinary hearings, the introduction of a fast-track procedure for a category of ‘special cases’ and the introduction of written warnings for dealing with less serious incidents of misconduct. For the first time, procedures were introduced with respect to the unsatisfactory performance and unsatisfactory attendance of police officers.

2.56 The Police Reform Act 2002 created the IPCC to replace the PCA. The IPCC came into existence on 1st April 2004. The IPCC has the capacity to conduct investigations itself in defined cases, rather than rely on an investigation by a police service. The new regime involves an open and transparent system for investigating complaints which is designed to engender public confidence.

2.57 Other significant changes are: the inclusion of police staff within the complaints system; a local resolution process; the extension of the system to cover conduct matters and an ability for witnesses and others (not just victims) to make complaints about police behaviour.

2.58 We have heard extensive criticism of the current system of dealing with police conduct and disciplinary matters. Whilst we have heard particular criticisms of how these issues are handled within the MPS, we have also received evidence about shortcomings in the system itself.

2.59 We will deal with issues peculiar to the MPS later in our report, however at this stage, we will concentrate on rehearsing some of the perceived difficulties with the current regime for police complaints and discipline. “I think there is no doubt that there is consensus that the current system is not working.” (Evidence of John Wadham, Deputy Chair IPCC.)

2.60 The system has been variously described to us as “too time consuming”, “too resource intensive”, “too legalistic” and “not meeting the needs of those who complain nor dealing fairly with those complained against”.

“The consistent messages that we have been hearing from officers, police staff and non-police stakeholders is that the current system is:

• Too slow
• Too adversarial and legalistic
• Too bureaucratic and doesn’t allow lessons to be learnt;
• Too closed; and
• Stressful for everyone involved.”

(Submission from Nick Hardwick, Chair of the IPCC.)

2.61 The Regulations are generally regarded as being too prescriptive and difficult to follow. They are accompanied by Home Office Guidance which is then translated by the MPS into Special Notices. An officer seeking to follow the Regulations has many different layers of documents to consult.

2.62 The formality of the process has other disadvantages. “The complaints system is perceived as them punishing us. It prevents investigators getting to the truth.” (Evidence of Ian Bynoe, PCA (now an IPCC Commissioner).)

“In our view, the current regulations encourage a system that is legalistic and does not promote opportunities for quick resolution that could be of benefit to both the police service and police officers.” (Submission from the Association of Police Authorities (APA).)

2.63 Disciplinary Tribunals have been likened to an extension of the Crown Court, with “… barristers arguing intricacies of the law often to the bewilderment of the police onlookers”, rather than a management process. (Submission from Ken Jones, Chief Constable of Sussex.)

“Other employers manage perfectly well with far more informal, less legalistic disciplinary hearings, and in fact manage better: quicker, more transparent, more focused on the employer and the employee. It seems simply unnecessary to introduce all these sort of bureaucratic legalistic elements to what is, in effect, an employment disciplinary hearing.”
(Evidence of Jane Deighton, Police Action Lawyers Group (PALG).)

2.64 But it is not just the hearing process that is governed by legal process. Officers are interviewed under caution (despite the civil standard of proof) and this can cause officers to be defensive and to take the option of making ‘no reply’ to questions from the investigating officers.

“In many years at the Police Complaints Authority … I have to state that I am staggered at the occasions one sees officers performing, one hopes, a professional role but being completely unprepared to tell their managers or investigators what happened. They will attend an interview, read a pre-prepared statement and then refuse to answer any questions, and believe that that is entirely consistent with the role of professional police officers. Now they are subject to a regulation 9 notice and the current caution means that they are perfectly entitled in law not to say a word in answer to a question. But it offends, I think, the public sense of what it is to be a police officer, that there is this inhibition which seems to be ingrained in some ways in the service.”
(Evidence of Ian Bynoe, PCA (now an IPCC Commissioner).)

2.65 In addition, sub judice rules apply and can delay progress in the misconduct investigation as, in practice, if there is any prospect of that investigation prejudicing any criminal proceedings, the misconduct investigation cannot proceed until the criminal proceedings are concluded.

2.66 Indeed, the current Regulations do not allow conduct matters to be dealt with in advance of any related criminal trial. Thus officers, who might be dismissed relatively quickly under an ordinary disciplinary procedure, stay suspended on full pay, at the expense of the tax payer, sometimes for many years while they wait for the criminal matter to be concluded.

2.67 As an example, we received evidence of one case where serious allegations of corruption were made against two officers in 1994. The officers were suspended in 1997. Further allegations were made and in 1998 the officers were charged with criminal offences in relation to these later allegations. The case was dismissed at committal proceedings in 1999. A disciplinary investigation then began with disciplinary papers being served in 2002. The case was heard in 2004 and both officers were required to resign. We make no comment on responsibility for the delays in this case but simply use it as an example of the unsatisfactory operation of the current system.

2.68 In addition the proceedings are characterised by the extensive involvement of lawyers:

“If one considers that it is quite possible that the existing framework can create a situation whereby the Presenting Officer is represented by Q.C. (and junior) instructed by the Force Solicitor, with another Q.C. likewise instructed to act as legal advisor to the Tribunal, and with yet another Q.C. representing the accused officer in a hearing scheduled over a period of many months (several weeks of which may be taken up with arguments on abuse of process and disclosure), then one sees at times the true nature of a system that has as its ultimate sanction the power to dismiss an individual from his or her employment. Such a scenario is impossible to reconcile with any easily understandable concept of a ‘management process’ as referred to in the submission of Ken Jones, the Chief Constable of Sussex Constabulary.”
(Submission from the Metropolitan Black Police Association (MBPA).)

2.69 The Inquiry has heard that delays have many causes and can sometimes be attributed to the investigating officers or to so-called ‘tactics’ employed on behalf of the officer to prolong or defer an investigation. “These range from abuse of ill health procedures to solicitors failing to consult their clients causing interviews to be delayed.” (Submission from Ken Jones, Chief Constable of Sussex.)

2.70 Officers subject to disciplinary investigation can be left suspended for several years while the process rolls on, or alternatively grinds to a halt. No one benefits from this antiquated and anachronistic system other than the guilty officer. An ‘innocent’ officer, most likely under great strain, is left to languish at home when he or she should be ‘on the streets’ protecting the public. The ‘guilty’ officer remains on the payroll at the taxpayers’ expense.

“It is well known that police officers can wait for up to a year to go before a disciplinary tribunal. Such delays are seriously damaging to the credibility of the disciplinary system and the complaints system. Delays of this magnitude mean difficulties in sustaining charges because witnesses’ memories have faded or they are unwilling to give evidence.”
(Submission from Sir Alistair Graham, former Chairman of the PCA.)

2.71 There is clearly a serious potential for such a long drawn out process to undermine public confidence in the police service. The APA drew our attention to the recent cases following from the BBC documentary, The Secret Policeman, as an example of this. In fact the probationers concerned resigned from the service soon after the programme was broadcast. However, in order to dismiss them, the service would have had to invoke the Regulations resulting in delay, etc. despite the strong video evidence against them. This is because, as sworn officers, they were entitled to the same protection as officers who have completed their probationary service.

2.72 Another concern is the use of ‘abuse of process’ arguments (which we accept an accused officer is entitled to raise) to frustrate the proceedings. It is not unusual for the first day of a disciplinary hearing or even longer to be dominated by legal arguments of this kind.

“… legal issues such as ‘abuse of process’ etc. are often raised. This does tend to cause bureaucratic delay in the process.”
(Submission from DAC Stephen Roberts, MPS.)

“Sometimes those abuse of process arguments go on for three weeks.”
(Evidence of Commander Phillip Hagon, MPS.)

“We have been taking some cases to the courts, and winning them on abuse of process. Now that is in nobody’s interest, for us to win a case on abuse of process, because at the end of the day, the question is not answered, either for the complainant or for the officer.”
(Evidence of Clint Elliott, General Secretary, Police Federation.)

2.73 Given the characteristics of the system which we have outlined above, it is hardly surprising “that misconduct proceedings regularly relate to events that happened many years before and, in the more complex of cases, that the whole process is routinely measured in terms of years rather than months, with a corresponding cost to the public purse that can be difficult to reconcile in the public opinion with a process that ostensibly is there to determine whether an individual should retain their current employment or not.” (Submission from the MBPA.)

2.74 The creation of the IPCC will undoubtedly bring some improvements to the system but it is faced with implementing a system which the Commission itself considers is “not working”. We will outline our recommendations for change in the next chapter of this report but, given the weight of evidence we have received, we, like the MBPA, “… find it hard to believe that anyone could seriously argue that such a system, even through what we hope will be the corrective filter of IPCC, represents the best and most efficient system available for resolving public and internal complaints against police officers.”

The employment status of police staff

2.75 In contrast to the complex regulations governing police officers, police staff are dealt with in a more straightforward and recognisable way.

2.76 They are employees of the police authority under the direction and control of the Commissioner (Chief Constable outside London) who is deemed the employer for the purposes of discipline and employment law. They have contracts of employment and have full employment rights under the law – including unrestricted access to an Employment Tribunal.

2.77 In addition to the employment statutes and regulations set out earlier, they have rights conferred by:

• Employment Rights Act 1996;
• Employment Relations Act 1999; and
• Fixed Term Employees (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2002.

Issues of discipline are dealt with under local disciplinary procedures with the usual rights of appeal etc.

2.78 In 2002, the first Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) joined the MPS. They now number approximately 1,400. They are uniformed police staff employed to support the public and assist police officers. They provide a visible presence on the street and act as an additional resource to deal with many of the tasks that do not require the experience or powers of police officers but which can take officers away from duties which do require that experience and those powers.

2.79 In London, PCSOs’ powers include the power to issue fixed penalty notices, the power to use reasonable force to detain someone, the power to detain someone for up to 30 minutes pending the arrival of a police officer and the power of entry to save life or limb or prevent serious damage to property.

2.80 It is likely that the role of the PCSO will be enhanced over the next few years, yet, for employment purposes, they are treated in the same way as police staff rather than officers. They are employees of the police authority and subject to staff disciplinary codes and procedures with full rights of access to Employment Tribunals.

The need for change

2.81 There is a powerful case for the wholesale review of the terms and conditions of police officers and for bringing them in line with their police staff colleagues and, indeed, the majority of the working population of the United Kingdom.

2.82 As indicated earlier, employment legislation has been constantly evolving over recent years with employees acquiring a multiplicity of new rights. Police officers have been the beneficiaries of some of these rights but remain subject to the same disciplinary procedures which have applied for years and which have their roots in the courts martial system of the 19th century.

2.83 The rationale for police officers having fewer rights than other workers in this country is not obvious and indeed flies in the face of commonsense. The rationale for police officers having fewer rights than their police staff colleagues is even more difficult to understand. There is, of course, the important issue of the office of constable but reconciling this office with ordinary employment rights ought not to be an insurmountable task.

2.84 Indeed, there is a compelling argument for a solution to be found. In addition to the criticisms we have already outlined, in our view, two recent developments now make it an imperative.

2.85 Firstly, the creation of the IPCC and its jurisdiction over complaints involving police staff mean that, in future, the situation is likely to arise where individuals involved in the same incident will be treated differently because one is a sworn officer and the other a member of police staff. One will be dealt with under the Regulations and the other under an ordinary disciplinary procedure.

2.86 Secondly, the introduction of PCSOs and the likelihood of their taking on an enhanced role mean that increasingly police staff will be carrying out duties hitherto discharged only by sworn officers. This again points to the unattractive certainty of differential treatment for two groups of people performing broadly similar roles.

2.87 To quote the President of ACPO’s submission to us: “It would be manifestly unjust if police officers and their unsworn colleagues should be subject to different systems. If a member of the public were to have cause to complain about an incident involving a constable, a police community support officer or a member of the police staff they would find the difference in procedure hard to understand or accept when all were attending the same incident. So would our staff.”

2.88 In the context of this changing policing environment, we consider that the time is overdue for a root and branch reform of the employment status of police officers and the Regulations which govern complaints and discipline.