Transcript of public session: Mr N Hardwick and Mr J Wadham of the Independent Police Complaints Commission

Tuesday, 8 June 2004
10.30 am

Sir William Morris: Good morning everyone. Good morning, Mr Hardwick, Mr Wadham, welcome back. Can I first of all thank you both for accepting yet again our invitation to attend the Inquiry and to give us some further evidence, and thank you also for the additional submission that we found extremely helpful.

I am sure you will recall the remit of our Inquiry and our method of approach, so I will dispense with some of the formalities here and go straight on to say that following these introductory words I will move straight into the questions. I will lead with a few questions to your good selves followed by my colleagues if they have any supplementary ones, and when we have completed our task in asking the questions we will offer you the opportunity to make a brief closing comment, if you so wish.

As before, let me for the record just point out that a transcript of our proceedings this morning is being taken in order to ensure that we have a proper record of all the evidence given by our witnesses, and this will be published on our website shortly following this morning's session.

Before I begin, for the benefit of the transcript, Mr Hardwick, Mr Wadham, I wonder if you would mind formally introducing yourselves to the Inquiry yet again.

Mr Hardwick: Good morning, Sir Bill, and thank you for the invitation to return. My name is Nick Hardwick and I am the Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

Mr Wadham: And I am John Wadham, I am the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

Sir William Morris: Welcome to you both.

Questions by Sir William Morris

Mr Hardwick and Wadham, I understand that the secretary to our Inquiry, Amanda Kelly, wrote to you on 5th May setting out the areas in which we are interested in seeking further evidence from you. Just to recap, as I understand it, they were firstly the emerging themes from the IPCC's experience of its first few weeks in operation, and the extent to which it would welcome some form of independence in terms of case management of the investigation of police complaints, grievance and disciplinary matters. Just those two, from me anyway.

You very helpfully set out your response to these matters in further written submissions, and it is against that background that we would want to explore with you how these issues and trends are emerging in your first few weeks of operation and any additional evidence that my colleagues and myself deemed useful to aid the Inquiry's work.

So let me begin by asking you, firstly, what in fact are the emerging themes from the IPCC's first few weeks of operation by way of your experience?

Mr Hardwick: Well, thank you, Sir Bill. Since we last met, the IPCC has become operational on 1st April, and I think, if it is not tempting fate too much, we have made a sound start, but it is still early days. So far we are in the process of conducting two independent investigations: one into a shooting incident in [redacted], and one into a shooting incident here in the Metropolitan Police Service. We are managing nine investigations and supervising a further 75.

As well as our investigative work, we have continued to build up our kind of guardianship, our oversight role, developing contact at a local level with forces, professional standards departments, police authorities and with other stakeholders.

I would say it is still very early days and so I am cautious about saying what themes have emerged at this point, but a couple of things I would draw your attention to.

One area that we had not really anticipated when we last met was the legal advice we obtained on Article 2 of the ECHR, and that is that where there was a suggestion of systematic failure or an allegation of misconduct into a serious case, the investigation needed to have institutional independence, and us managing the investigation would not in itself be enough to ensure that independence, and that if we were not to investigate a matter like that ourselves, an external force would need to be used. And so we have required the use of external forces into incidents more than we had previously anticipated.

In some ways, in some of those cases, that is an appropriate thing to do. In other cases, I think there are issues around the benefits of police forces criss-crossing the country, investigating each other, and whether sometimes the external force can bring in the skills and experience that the home force might be able to apply itself. So that has been a problematic area. We are in discussions with ACPO about this. They are getting their own advice and we will have a conference of counsels to try and work out with ACPO a common way forward.

The other area is that, as I think I said last time, we had originally hoped to begin our independent investigations by the start of July. In fact we have been able to start those ahead of schedule and, as I said, we have already started two independent investigations into two serious cases.

In terms of more general themes, I think one of the things that has been very striking in the cases that we have dealt with so far have been the number of incidents where the mental health of, if you like, the victim, or the person who has been the victim of the incident, has been a factor. And one of the things we will look at in future is the extent to which, to use perhaps a cliche, the Police Service has become a sort of social service of last resort, and why it is that people with these kinds of mental health problems are ending up in police custody and why they are not being dealt with more effectively by other agencies. But when it is the case that people with mental health problems end up in custody, the extent to which the various police services and the officers on the front line have the skills and support they need to deal with matters of that kind.

Finally I would say that we have been encouraged by the extent to which, as we have become operational, we have been able to maintain the support of our stakeholders both in the Police Service and those who represent the complainants.

Sir William Morris: The numbers you have given us in terms of live and active cases does not of course include what you describe as the legacy of inheritance.

Mr Hardwick: No.

Sir William Morris: Do you have any anticipated dates about when these might be cleared, the legacy cases?

Mr Hardwick: We have about 1,800 legacy cases of various sorts. We hope to have cleared most of those within about a year. Some of them are very complex investigations where the timescale is outside our control, but what we hope to see is a steady decline over the next 12 months in the number of those cases, and I think by the end of a 12-month period we should only be left with a handful.

Sir William Morris: Early days, no trends, but any feedback from, if I can describe them as the user groups, like police services or...

Mr Hardwick: In terms of feedback from the Police Service, I have been encouraged to the extent by which we have had, and continue to have, a positive reaction. Certainly if we look at the most serious cases where we have been directly involved, there has been a good response from the forces themselves; we have had all the co-operation that we could ask for.

One of the things I said to you last time that we would try and do is make a particular effort to keep the officers involved informed of the progress of enquiries. If I could give a couple of examples of a case we are dealing with, an independent investigation into a shooting in [redacted].

We took over that investigation on a Friday. By the Monday our senior investigating officer had met with the officers concerned to explain the process we would follow, to answer any questions they had about our processes and about the IPCC, and I think that was generally well received.

And in other parts of the country we have made a particular effort to make sure that the officers involved are aware of our role, that they understand the IPCC, and that – obviously there might be questions about the case we cannot answer, but we can explain about the organisation and about our general approach, and generally that does seem to have been well received.

We have also made a particular effort, of course, to maintain regular contact with the families of victims where there has been a death, and again I think that has been appreciated.

Sir William Morris: Good. Just on the basis of feedback, information that has been offered to us on one or two visits is the opportunity to have a regional liaison; that has come across as extremely positive and something that police officers have offered to us that they are looking forward to that sort of regional relationship. I do not know whether you have any feedback on that.

Mr Hardwick: That is right, I would agree with that. One of the advantages we have over the Police Complaints Authority is that we are regionally based. We have regional officers in Cardiff, Leicester, Manchester and of course here in London, and we have commissioners and teams of investigators and support staff based in those offices, and my colleagues have made a particular effort to maintain contact with forces and other community groups at a regional level. I think that really does help.

For instance, with the Professional Standards Departments, we are not just in contact with them when there is a problem; we are maintaining regular contact and getting a feel for how they are operating and gradually building up our capacity to issue our own kind of guidance about how we think things should work. And as part of that also we have maintained contact with police authorities in each force.

As our experience and knowledge of individual forces grows, and how the system is operating at the moment develops, we will issue statutory guidance in the autumn, probably around October, and we will do that in a consultative way in discussion with forces and other interested groups.

Sir William Morris: Just one last point from me. Early days yet, and I think we all agree on that, but based on inherited experience I note that you are coming to the view, as a commission, that some review of the disciplinary process is desirable, and that is something that in the fullness of time, no doubt, as a commission, you will want to turn your attention to.

But in the meantime, you are indicating that you see possible scope for using the fast-track procedure more extensively. I do not know whether you want to offer us any additional information to your written evidence on that?

Mr Hardwick: Perhaps I could ask my colleague John Wadham to answer that in a moment, because he is representing the IPCC on the Home Office's review of the disciplinary processes.

But, as I said to you, I think, last time we met, my experience in the set-up phase is that in some ways there was a consensus around, if you like, the critique of the current disciplinary rules, in the same way as there had been a consensus around the problems with the previous investigative process. The difference, I think, is that there was a common view about how the investigative process should be reformed, whilst with the disciplinary process, I think, while there may be a common view of the problems, there was not necessarily a common view of the solution.

I think since we last met our views have firmed up somewhat. They are still in the process of development, but perhaps I could hand over to John and he could explain a bit more of our thinking on that.

Mr Wadham: Thanks, Nick.

I think we think that the IPCC is part of the solution in relation to the investigation process, but actually we have not concentrated enough on the discipline process, and that is something that we are taking some time to look at. It is obviously very sensible that the Home Office has initiated a review, because I think we have not done enough research on the history, but as far as we can tell the history of the discipline process seems to be in parallel with the kind of militaristic courts martial, which, of course, is not about modern management practice; and you know better than we do the difficulties that that causes in relation to investigations, the delays. And of course not just for the individual complainants but also for the officers, where we have spent years dealing with things where, in another sensible organisation, management practices which were based on fairness to the employee would resolve these things within days and possibly weeks. So I think we need to move towards that.

We are of course concerned not to lose two important parts of the current system: one is that the complainant would have some kind of role, would know what was happening, because of course in relation to normal employment practices the complainant is excluded from the process because it is solely controlled by management; and the second issue is the important one of the public interest being represented. Where a chief police officer or others are reluctant to take disciplinary action then the IPCC, or previously the PCA, can have a role in encouraging et cetera, and that is important and something we do not want to lose.

I think we need to design a system way which is more sophisticated, particularly to ensure that officers are protected; that the process is speeded up.

Just on a kind of footnote in relation to our evidence, there is a problem about the fast-track process. I think there have been some problems with that. It has not been used as often as it should have been in the past and now the legislation seems to create a difficulty where perhaps it cannot be used at all, and that is very unfortunate. We are in some discussions with the Home Office about whether we can change that because, from our perspective, resolving a discipline matter should be able to be dealt with quickly, and if there are criminal prosecutions perhaps they should take as long as they are going to take but you should not need to have to wait for that process and, you know, there are very many examples where perhaps changing that would make a real difference.

I think we have sorted out, or we are in the process of sorting out the investigation stage, and now we have got to look at the discipline stage, and I think we would very much welcome any recommendations you have about the direction that that should take so that that can influence our approach and obviously the Home Office's approach.

Sir William Morris: There is a view emerging, I think, that fast-track is fine insofar as it goes, but you need more than well over 50 per cent certainty, because, if along the process there is any reason for withdrawal, then that is it, you have lost your chance, because double jeopardy comes in and you cannot start on another track. You cannot have fast-track and slow track; you have to make a choice.

Mr Wadham: No, exactly. I think the solution needs to be more radical than the fast-track process. In ordinary employment situations, if someone is accused of something which is a disciplinary matter as well as potentially a criminal offence, then the disciplinary matter can be dealt with quickly, and if the person then subsequently is prosecuted, there is no reason why the disciplinary matter should affect that criminal prosecution, so that employers can deal with things quickly.

It is not just about the efficiency in relation to managers, it is also about the individual police officers, because one of the things that shocked me, I think, in the time that I have been at the IPCC is processes where investigations take a long time – and we hope to do something about that – then consideration by the Crown Prosecution Service takes a long time, criminal prosecutions then occur, often those do not succeed, or individuals are not convicted, whether they should or should not be, and of course you then have to look at the discipline process at the end.

So the police officer as well as the member of the public who may have made a complaint is having to wait years for something and that creates difficulties, and I think we need to work backwards and say, "Look, if there is a discipline matter, then unless that is going to prejudice the criminal process that should be dealt with quickly". And so I think there are directions in which we would want to go, and I hope that your Inquiry, Sir Bill, will make a difference.

Sir William Morris: Thank you very much. Could I invite Miss Weekes to put a few questions to you.

Questions by Miss Weekes

Miss Weekes: Can I, as it is convenient, continue on the line of disciplinary matters, because I have got a few questions to raise now that we are much clearer ourselves about the issues in relation to the conduct of disciplinary hearings for either of you, but it may well be that John Wadham may want to continue on this vein.

The present state of conduct of disciplinary hearings from the majority of witnesses who have come before us indicate that they are far too legalistic, lawyers on the defence side constantly raise abuse of process and other legal challenges that take up quite a lot of time. They are run far too much like strict evidential criminal proceedings. So I wonder whether you have any views – I know that you are looking at this at the moment but it is a very important area – I wonder whether you have any views as to whether we 15 could sensibly consider streamlining the conduct of disciplinary hearings, because we are going to be stuck with the regulations for a while to come; it is going to take some time to change those regulations; they are not going to happen overnight.

So if I can just have your comments, from either of you, about the conduct of the proceedings themselves.

Mr Wadham: Perhaps I could start. I think the first thing is that the commission does not have a settled view on everything yet, but I think there is no doubt that there is a consensus that the current system is not working; that, in a sense, the paraphernalia of the discipline process seems to be modelled on the criminal process, and although the IPCC is committed to ensuring that there is a fair system for police officers and their rights are respected, nevertheless the issues that ordinarily – the protections and safeguards that are necessary in the criminal process do not need to be available to officers.

For instance, the issue of adverse inferences and the right to silence is very strange in the employment context. We have mentioned already the fast-track process. Abuse of process ordinarily would not have a place in the employment context in relation to the gathering of evidence. What we want to do, I think, is to move closer to an employment ACAS kind of model, without losing the important protections that officers should have. That will require changes in the law and in the regulations, and we would want to see those changes, and we want to participate in that. And I hope, as I said, that your Inquiry can make a difference in ensuring that that process begins.

In answer to the second part of the question, which is what we do in the meantime, I think that is more difficult, because obviously police officers, their Federation representatives and lawyers, are quite likely to want to insist on the rights that they currently have. I think we would like to look in more detail about what can be done within the current system, but I think it is not easy to see obvious changes without changes to the rules and the regulations.

For instance, a couple of changes that were made in 1999, the double jeopardy change and the change in relation to the standard of proof from beyond reasonable doubt to the civil standard, do not seem to have made as much difference as some people who were urging those changes thought they would have.

Miss Weekes: Indeed, it seems to have been operating on a sliding scale which is even worse.

Mr Wadham: Yes, there are some complicated legal arguments. But I think you started your question in relation to the involvement of lawyers, and I think it has got over-legalistic, there have been too many lawyers, and I do not think that has always served the officers' interests. People who have had disciplinary or criminal processes hanging over them for years, they are not able to make any headway in terms of promotion, then sometimes they are suspended: the consequences are that nothing happens at the end of it, so the complainant is not satisfied. I think we need to change this process and we need to do so as quickly as possible. That is what we will be urging, I think, in relation to the Home Office.

But I do not know what the answers are in the short-term, I am afraid.

Mr Hardwick: Can I just add something very briefly to that. I think some of it is to do with, if you like, processes and procedures and regulations, but some of it is also to do with the culture in which the disciplinary processes operate. This may be a bit of a generalisation, but if one looks at ordinary civilian employment disciplinary processes, when you are dealing with the lower levels of misconduct, the stated purpose of the exercise is not simply to punish the offender, but it is to find methods of improving and preventing, if you like, the misconduct or the error happening again.

My observation is – still I feel something of an outsider to the police system – the emphasis and the culture is very much on the punishment and the penalty; it is not on improvement. It seems to me that this is something the forces and police authorities could look at without trying to change the culture in which the disciplinary process is operating.

Some of that is around rewarding good behaviour, so that when officers do co-operate with the process, when they are prepared to say, "Yes, in hindsight, I did make a mistake there; I did get that wrong", that they do not then feel that the whole weight of the system comes crashing down on them, but that where they show a willingness to learn from their mistakes and to change their behaviour, that that is encouraged and supported and then does not become simply further ammunition for them to be punished.

So I think some of those sort of cultural changes that need to be made at the top I think would be better, because it seems to me that one of the things that is necessary in order to change the system is that there has to be some sort of degree of trust in the motives of the people doing it. The Police Federation and others will need to feel – part of the reason they take the adversarial approach that they do, I am sure, is because they do not trust the system, and therefore you get yourself into a vicious circle. If we could build some trust back into the system.

The point, certainly for the lower level issues, is around improvement and prevention; that might move some way in the right direction, I think.

Miss Weekes: Just one final point on the disciplinary. One significant block to the movement of a disciplinary case is the right of the officer to remain silent. I put it that way because you will both know – and I think John Wadham has already said it – that in ordinary employment law, of course, the whole point of dealing with an issue of conduct is that the manager/employer is able to say, "Perhaps you can help me with what went wrong here; what is your explanation?" If it is given on day one then immediately one has the ability to move to a resolution.

Where you have this legal approach which the officers are entitled to take advantage of, that they can remain silent, the Department of Professional Standards have no power to demand an explanation for some time, particularly when the officer goes sick.

So we might want to consider – and I would welcome both your views – on a reform basis for later a change in the statute that requires officers to give an explanation.

Mr Hardwick: We would agree with that. I think our view is that it may be a different matter where an officer faces criminal proceedings, but aside from that I have not heard any convincing explanation why an officer should not have to give an account of their actions while they were on duty, in the same way as any other employer. I have not heard any, I think, persuasive argument why that should not be the case.

Indeed, I think sometimes that would be in the officer's interest to do, because they would be able to give an explanation where one is possible. But also sometimes I think that would really help narrow the focus of any subsequent inquiry. I am aware, for instance, not in cases that we have been involved in, where we have had good support from the officers involved, who have been willing to give us early accounts of what has happened, and therefore has enabled us at an early stage to focus down on the key issues.

But I am aware of previous cases, under the old system, where, for instance, there has been a shooting, where the officers actually involved in the incident, including those wide in the outer cordon, have not been 21 willing to give an account of what happened. Therefore when the inquiry starts it has got to inevitably take a very broad brush approach before it can focus down onto the key issues. That delays things. That puts people who were perhaps on the periphery, with no suggestion, it later turns out, of any wrongdoing, somehow caught in the net of the inquiry.

I think it would be in everybody's interest if there was a much greater obligation for people to give an account of the actions they took while they were on duty.

Miss Weekes: You have correctly emphasised that criminal proceedings are quite different.

Mr Hardwick: Yes.

Mr Wadham: Just to follow that, I would find it bizarre if my boss, Nick Hardwick, was not able to ask me, "Where were you on 8th June, at 11 o'clock, and what were you doing, and why did you so badly mishandle your evidence at the Morris Inquiry?", or whatever else he was to say. So I do find that strange.

As a human rights lawyer, there is no justification for this from the European Convention on Human Rights or anywhere else. There is, of course, in the context of criminal law, but there is not, and I do not think there should be, in relation to employment issues.

Miss Weekes: Can I move on to quite another important area, and it is the whole question of the high profile cases. I know that you will know that part of our terms of reference is to look at high profile cases, and I reminded myself of the statutory basis of your powers to supervise, manage and to investigate, and for any authority who considers that there are exceptional circumstances, or indeed the gravity of the subject matter, can ask you to investigate.

There are within the Met high profile cases, which we have looked at, and cases of some sensitivity. Some of those cases involve discrimination, and race is high on the agenda for how the Met often has a difficulty with dealing with issues which relate to who they call visible ethnic minority officers; black, Asian or others.

I just wonder whether you are beginning to have a feel for how you will view your statutory guidance about those cases, because we have heard evidence which gives us some concern that these cases are not always being handled effectively at a local level. Officers are oversensitive about how they manage, how they deal with conduct issues; they tend to go up the hierarchy far too quickly. Certainly with the case of Superintendent Ali Dizaei, the evidence he gave yesterday is, "Well, I was disproportionately investigated because of my race".

Just generally, do you have any comments about management of those types of cases? I am not going into the detail of Ali Dizaei, but I use it as an example only.

Mr Hardwick: I think we do, yes. First of all, I think they go to the heart of our responsibilities, because when we look at our own approach on an individual case, we would consider not only, if you like, the gravity of the incident in terms of its sort of impact on an individual, the injury or death of an individual, but also its effect on public and police confidence. And there is no doubt in my mind that some of the cases where race has been an issue have had a huge impact on both public confidence and on police confidence. And that would certainly be a very significant factor in determining our own involvement.

To some extent, of course, our ability to be involved will depend on the resources that we have, and we are in discussions with the Home Office about a growth in our resources. We want to get to the state where we can do about 200 investigations a year. If we were doing that, that would enable us to do, for instance, the 100 or so cases each year where there has been a death following police contact.

But the other, if you like, 100 that we have we would try and use in a thematic way, either to look across the board that there is a real concern about cases involving race right across the board, right across all forces, and we will take in some of the most serious of those and investigate, or we might say, "Look, all the evidence we are getting from our stakeholders, from the force itself, is that this particular force has a difficulty with these kinds of issues so we will go in and look at those and undertake those investigations ourselves".

If we can increase our capacity then we have an ability to get directly involved.

But also certainly in terms of the cases that we supervise, the lower levels of involvement, race will be a very significant factor for us, because there is no doubt – if you look at some of the high profile cases, I think, regardless of the merits of the case itself, regardless of the rights or wrongs of the case itself, there is no doubt that those cases have had a very serious impact on public confidence and on police confidence itself.

Without going into the details – in the Dizaei case, for instance.

Miss Weekes: Or Virdi.

Mr Hardwick: Or Virdi. I have been struck within the Metropolitan Police Service by how big an issue it is and how much that case has undermined confidence in the whole system. Whatever view people take on that case, often on partial information, whatever view they take, there is no doubt it has damaged the (inaudible) of the investigative and disciplinary processes, and that would be a very strong reason for our involvement, and I think it would be a major improvement.

Part of the sort of strategy for this, something I hope we will be able to do, is take your own recommendations on these points and then have a long-term ability to follow those through. So what I would expect will be happening is that you will be making recommendations about how these things are dealt with and we then, hopefully over the longer term, will have the capacity to pursue those and to make sure they are being implemented. So from that point of view this Inquiry has been very productive for us.

Miss Weekes: A number of witnesses are saying to us, "Well, we really would rather like an independent person to have a look at some point at the sensitive investigations to see that things are going okay". I am rather anxious to look at what we have already got to see whether you can improve what you have got, because if you involve too many independent other persons one might get more confusion and imbalance than what you have got.

I looked again at your ability to look at these cases. What do you say of their requests for an independent person in these types of cases?

Mr Hardwick: Well, I do think there is a danger about too many people getting involved, and therefore it not being clear-cut where the buck stops, which I think would be a problem. I hope that we will be able to meet some of those concerns through our supervisory role, because, in a sense, when we do supervise a case, what we are doing – we are not conducting the investigation itself, but we are having oversight, we are asking the kind of critical questions at key times in an independent way, and ultimately we can say, "Look, we are not happy with the conclusion of this".

And so I think our supervisory role does, if you like, provide the independent element of oversight or case management into cases of that nature, or could do, and I think that is something we would want to build on and develop.

And if we were supervising a case and there was an independent element, and there was a difference of view, for instance, I think that would start to get very complicated and might actually then add to the delays and bureaucracy in the system, which nobody wants.

Mr Wadham: One of the things that the Police Complaints Authority did not have was the ability to call into conduct matters that did not involve complaints from members of the public. We have that. I think there has been a cultural change with the police because I think they are now beginning to refer cases – or contact us and say, "Do you think you should supervise this case?" or, "What do you think your involvement in this case should be?". And we have not had to call in cases in a direct way as a result of that power, so that is important.

A lot of the examples that people talk about in relation to the failure of the system have been cases that did not necessarily start out with a complaint from a member of the public, or not an official complaint, and there are often issues between officers or issues of discipline. We are now in a position to ensure that those are supervised by us, and in some cases could be managed by us, or we could independently investigate them.

So I think we have the powers and I think we can use those, but it is early days because, of course, perhaps in the longer term we will be able to demonstrate that that does make a difference; we hope so. But as Nick suggested, it is very difficult to see how you add on yet another independent element. But we have no problem with officers, whether they are being subject to investigations, or other officers or anyone else contacting us saying, "This is one you should look at, you should call this one in", because we have the power to do that and we could then actually provide that independent element. We could provide it both in terms of ensuring that the investigation is thorough and effective, but also I hope to ensure that the investigation is proportionate and that people concentrate on what the terms of reference are about and focus on what the real issue is rather than investigating everything that may or may not be connected.

I hope we can do what is necessary. The proof of the pudding is whether we deliver.

Miss Weekes: I am grateful for those encouraging comments.

Just moving on to accountability, we welcome the right of appeal to every member of the public who feels dissatisfied with their complaint at whatever stage the complaint is. It is interesting to note – and I am not suggesting that it should be there, but it is not there – that an officer who has gone through disciplinary proceedings or an investigation who feels justifiably cross and upset at the decision to investigate, the method, the amount of money spent, the time spent, does not have a right of appeal to anybody within the statutory guidelines.

Let us take, for example, Gurpal Virdi or Ali Dizaei as a classic example. If, halfway through their investigation, they have become understandably and correctly disgruntled on a proper basis that the conduct of the investigation was quite wrong, or against acceptable police practice, it might be helpful that they could appeal to a body like yourselves.

In a way, perhaps, your supervisory role does take that into account, but move it forward. If at the end of an investigation it all goes completely wrong, and unfortunately things do go wrong and will still go wrong, a number of officers have said that the trouble is we do not have any comeback, that officer gets promoted through the ranks and nobody is accountable, we cannot complain about the wrong done to us. Any comments?

Mr Wadham: I think the first thing is that if an investigation is being carried out by officers in a force in relation to another officer, as I said earlier, anyone can ask us to intervene in that process, we can supervise that investigation, we could manage that investigation or we could take over the investigation ourselves, and we can do that at any point, halfway through – whether in fact in any particular case it would be good to do it halfway through, but we could do so.

So officers, I think, in the future are now in the position that they can actually call – they cannot call us in, but they can ask us, as could a member of the public, as could a particular police force. So that is an added safeguard.

The second thing, of course – and this has happened – is that where the investigating officers are accused of misconduct themselves, then again that is an issue that we can investigate. So if there are allegations of misconduct with the investigators, and there have been in some of the cases you mentioned, then that can be investigated, and of course we can supervise, manage or independently investigate that.

So I think there is a degree of accountability in the new system that there was not in the past, and I hope that we can sensibly exercise those powers.

In relation to the discipline process, of course, there are all the appeal mechanisms that exist for officers, so I am not so concerned about that issue. I think accountability, in a case where we have been involved, or perhaps where we have failed to be involved, is down to us at that stage.

So I am not saying that more cannot be done, and we perhaps need to look at practice perhaps on the basis of your recommendations, but I think we have moved a long way towards a better system for ensuring more effective and more efficient and proportionate investigations.

Mr Hardwick: If I could just very briefly add to that. I do think also we have got to be conscious of the need to keep the system proportionate and timely, and I think at some point you have to draw a line and be able to say, "Look, this is as far as we have gone with this." I think if there was evidence of misconduct or allegations of misconduct on the part of investigating officers then of course that would need to be dealt with. But I think you have got to be able – you can imagine yourself getting into a situation where the original allegation is not upheld so there is an investigation into the investigating officers, then there is an investigation into the people investigating the investigating officers. There could be no end to it, so you have to be able to draw lines round it at some point, I think, and you have to make sure that there is a system that is robust and cannot be abused by people throwing up sort of red herrings or false allegations. You have got to get a balance in there, I think.

Miss Weekes: And finally, speed of investigations. I know that you have kindly commented about whether or not you could oversee or take into account an independent case manager, and if I might say, I agree with you about that, that it ought not to be you because you are part of investigating cases. But can I just, very briefly, deal with the principle, because the practicalities of this would need to be worked out. Where this particular case manager sits and to whom he will be responsible is another issue.

You will both be extremely familiar with the way criminal cases are fixed and case managed; you will be familiar with how employment law cases are fixed and case managed. It seems to me not impossible to have case management of disciplinary cases, complaint cases, so that someone, somewhere, is responsible for bringing the parties together to ensure that the case moves, applications for adjournments, are considered on a proper basis, applications for sick leave are considered on a proper basis, disclosure is considered on a proper basis, and the fixing of cases is considered on a proper basis. Just that in principle.

Mr Wadham: There are two parts of the case management. I think we are suggesting that we are able to deal with the case management of the investigation stage, but I think there is a real virtue in having case management once the investigation is over. I would not want it to be – we have already talked about being overly legalistic; I would not want it to get into difficulties. But I think the reforms in the civil process, the Woolf Report, have recommended that you can make a difference to speeding cases up, and I think that case management in the criminal process works well as well.

Actually, as soon as the disciplinary tribunal is seized of a matter, then I think they should be in control of the running of it so that we can make sure that things speed up, decisions about adjournment, decisions about disclosure, decisions about orchestrating or choreography of the process, and that is more likely to mean that it would come to a conclusion quickly. We have not given much thought to how that should work, but we are hoping that you can help us.

Miss Weekes: I think that person ought to be legally qualified so that they can be judicially reviewed.

Mr Wadham: As a lawyer, I would have to agree with that.

Miss Weekes: Do you have any comments to make on case management?

Mr Hardwick: I agree with what John said here. I think it goes back on to the general theme we have talked about around the disciplinary process, where it seems to me that the starting point ideally should not be the current system and how do we patch it up, but I think we should be looking at what is best practice in ordinary civilian employment matters and what of that is applicable to the Police Service. There are bound to be some elements because of the police's special powers and responsibilities, and in some cases they need protection, the system does need to be different.

I think we ought to be looking at best practice in other jurisdictions, other employment situations, and trying to apply that to the Police Service. I think, as I said before, both in terms of regulation and procedure, and in terms of the culture and style almost of the way in which these things are done, much of this is applicable and transferrable and that ought to be done.

Miss Weekes: Thank you.

Sir William Morris: Thank you very much indeed. I know Sir Anthony has got one or two points he wants to explore with you.

Questions by Sir Anthony Burden

Sir Anthony Burden: I would like to pursue that point in more detail, if I may, because I actually think there is a big gap ahead of this stage that we have been discussing and that is the management of cases during the investigation. The main points that concern me boil down to delays, which we have dealt with; poor use of suspension and the extended suspension of officers, and we are dealing in the Metropolitan Police with two who have been suspended for seven and a half years; the setting of dates for hearings and the managing of that process through; and the dealing disproportionately with black and minority staff.

If I may just refer to a synopsis that has been prepared in the office for me – because not being a lawyer, trying to digest 750 pages of a piece of statute is not my idea of fun – about the general duties of police authorities. You will be very familiar with this, I know. But it seems to me that Section 15 of the new Act really, as it says there, is in effect a reincarnation of Section 77 of the old Act, so there is nothing new in that; the wording is as loose as it was and open to interpretation, I guess, by the Police Authority as to how robust they are in managing the process.

But having had the opportunity to look at some suggestive protocol on the way that this is to be interpreted, there is a lot of reference to the Police Service notifying police authorities, to providing information, to a police authority being available to provide advice, to manage and monitor expenditure on settling cases, but precious little about holding people to account and to having true oversight of what is obviously going wrong at the moment in terms of delays, suspension, setting of dates for hearings, and therefore the whole thing, as you have both referred to, just drags on and on and on and confidence goes down the drain as a consequence of that.

I really am looking for something which does hold the Directorate of Professional Standards to account in relation to the way it does its business, and for somebody to say, "I am sorry, but the delay which is beginning to build in this case is absolutely unacceptable". That is in the day-to-day case management; it is not about 3 monthly or 6 monthly reviews; it is actually about day-to-day management. Some would argue, well, surely it ought to be the person who is in charge of the department's responsibility to do that, but if it is not being done effectively, can I just seek your views as to the role you currently have, under the not particularly distinguished legislation that you are having to work within, how you might see your role building in relation to that, and what you would insist ought to be done by the Directorate of Professional Standards to manage its business better?

Mr Hardwick: I think we do have a contribution to make in that area. First of all, I think when one considers the role of the Police Authority in discipline and conduct matters, I think that does need to be treated with a degree of caution. It does seem to me that there is a potential problem with, if you like – particularly if the accountability generally of a police force to a police authority for operational matters is increased, it seems to me a safeguard in that process is that conduct issues are dealt with separately, and ultimately a sort of fall back position for a police officer asked to do anything improper is that I am not accountable to you for my conduct. So I would put in that caveat.

Having said that, in the set-up phase of the IPCC I went round to every police force and practically in all of those met with members of the Police Authority for Professional Standards Committee, and it was very striking the difference in their approach. The best ones were doing exactly what you said; they would be meeting regularly, they would be getting a list, by reference number, of all the cases, what stage they were at, how long they were taking to be dealt with.

I saw police authorities giving the head of Professional Standards Department a very tough time about why delays were there on a particular case, what was being done about it, what had gone wrong, and also I think the force as much as the Police Authority, a very kind of direct involvement in looking at the handling of particular cases and how they were being dealt with, without actually getting into, if you like, deciding on the case, dealing with the conduct matters itself, but holding that force to account for its efficiency of the process.

On the other hand, I saw some which were frankly that the Police Authority was kept very much at arm's length, they were given a few hand-picked files to look at once a quarter and that was pretty much it, really, and there was not an effective process.

I think there are two things that we could do to help police authorities in their role. First of all, we will soon be in a position to provide them with the kind of data about the performance of their force in these areas as compared with other comparable forces, so I think we can really give people hard evidence for holding their force to account. But also I hope we will have the kind of level of informal contact with the police authorities so that we both have a sort of common picture of what is going on and what is working well and what is not.

The second thing I hope we are going to be able to do is in a more systematic way than I have described is identify the forces where the best practice is happening, and then produce guidance in conjunction with the APA for police authorities about what is best practice.

Although the network is working a lot better now, I have often been struck by how unaware Police Authority members might be in one force about what their colleagues are doing in a neighbouring force. I think that is improving and I know the APA are looking at this very seriously. I have a good relationship with them. But I think we can add some real value there trying to identify and promote best practice in conjunction with the APA so that police authorities are better able to do precisely what you suggested.

Sometimes I think they are not very clear about what they can ask for; you know, it is a very difficult task for them, and I think it is quite easy for them to be put off if that is what the force tries to do. So I would like to see a strengthened hierarchy. I think that is a key part of our partnership with police authorities.

Sir Anthony Burden: So you would see the overall solution to this in strengthening the role of police authorities by giving them better management data, by spreading best practice?

Mr Hardwick: Yes.

Sir Anthony Burden: But you very firmly see it as their responsibility, not a new body or –

Mr Hardwick: No, I do see that. We have talked about this before, you can have too many bodies doing this, and, as I say, I think you do need to make a distinction between the authority's role, if you like, for the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, which I think is proper, and their role actually, if you like, in determining conduct matters which I think does cause me more problems. But I think if you can maintain that distinction, I think that is an area which is, as I say, not necessarily something which is completely new, but actually if we could simply bring all forces up to the standard of the best practice that is happening now, I think that would be a very big change.

Mr Wadham: The contribution I was going to make is, actually, do they really need any more powers to do precisely what you are asking them to do, because I do not think they do.

Sir Anthony Burden: No.

Mr Wadham: And like Nick, I have been around at least half of the country and met some of the police authorities, and some of them are dedicated to making a difference, and in some places it is more of a backwater, and perhaps the changes that you may recommend, and the work that the IPCC is doing, will enable, empower Police Authority members in the discipline subcommittees to actually ensure that they are actually responsible and they take control. I think that is something that we hope is beginning to happen and we would like to see more of it.

I am not sure it needs more powers or legislation; I think that is something that they could do tomorrow, and perhaps that is something that they should do.

Sir Anthony Burden: Yes. Finally, can I just deal with the issue of the Taylor Report, and thank you, once again in your initial submission you refer to your support for the Taylor recommendations.

I can only speak personally. I get a sense, as I talk to people, that that report is not as widely understood – the recommendations are not as widely accepted in terms of day-to-day management of complaints at the moment as I would have expected them to be, and therefore the Taylor Report recommendations are not actually kicking in in relation to the way that cases are being managed. Superintendent Dizaei referred yesterday to his inquiry, saying it was a train that once it started rolling nothing was going to stop it. The Taylor Report recommendations would have stopped it.

Mr Hardwick: Yes, we have certainly tried to ensure that we have had Bill Taylor in actually doing training sessions for our commissioners on precisely those issues, and we are looking very hard in terms of our own practice about complying with his recommendations about tighter terms of reference, about strategic management of cases. And I think the train analogy is a good one. I think one of the kind of difficulties with the system at the moment is that it is a nonstop train; once you decide to get on, you cannot get off until the train reaches its destination. So if you get on at Euston, the train does not stop till it gets to Glasgow and that is it.

One of the things that we have been able to do in the new system is we have developed the practice of sending in assessors to cases at an early stage, who are normally our SIOs – in fact all our SIOs are experienced former police investigators. One of the things that means is that when the commissioners come to make a decision on that case about how we are going to investigate it we have got information from the scene, from our own people, about what the issues are. And so actually we have been able to downgrade some inquiries and say, "Actually, look, there is nothing in this for us", and when you have an initial look, it is clear that there is not a serious matter of misconduct here or a serious matter of public concern. We can leave it to the force to deal with.

Whereas I think in the old system, because you did not have, if you like, that on the spot reporting from our own people, it would be much more likely that that would have been ramped up the scale and then the whole process would have kicked in and people would not have been able to get off the train. One of the ways we want to husband our very scarce resources is to be able to, if you like, ramp things up or down according to the information we are getting about the seriousness of a matter.

Bill Taylor's recommendations are a significant sort of foundation for how we are going to operate, and we certainly want to try and promote that to other forces, and we have been doing that in terms of things like the (inaudible) terms of reference.

Sir Anthony Burden: In the visits you are both making and your regional staff, you are also looking, are you, to ensure that the partners of professional standards are implementing the Taylor recommendations on a day-to-day basis? I think that is where I would sense there is a gap in the understanding at the moment.

Mr Hardwick: We have started to do that and where we are in that process is that we had Bill Taylor doing a day's training for our commissioners at the end of May, and so from that point we are taking this forward now to a much more operational level about our interactions with the departments of professional standards. So we are very early days yet, but for me personally it is very high on my list of priorities in terms of the things I have read so far that have made an impression on me about changes, I think that is a key document and I am personally very committed to carrying out the recommendations that are in it.

Sir Anthony Burden: Thank you very much.

Miss Weekes: It is a very small request. You have both mentioned that in your trips around the country you have spotted some good practice of police authorities supervising complaints. I would be very grateful for just a list of those police authorities, if you can send them in.

Mr Hardwick: Okay. We will see what we can do about that.

Miss Weekes: I am grateful. Thank you very much.

Sir William Morris: Mr Hardwick, Mr Wadham, thank you very much indeed. We have come to the end of the questions that we wanted to seek your further clarification on and we are grateful. But I did say at the introductory stage of our session this morning that you would have not quite the last word but a chance to make any closing comments that you wish. If either of you wish to offer that, then we would like to hear it.

Mr Hardwick: Well, perhaps to reiterate two points that I think have emerged from our discussion so far. One is about the role of the IPCC. I think that we have made a sound start; I think that is acknowledged. It is early days yet. What I say is we are very keen to work in partnership with police authorities in the way that we develop our role, and I think it is important that that concept of partnership – so we are not both trying to do the same thing, but we both recognise distinct roles that are complementary, and I think we are on track to developing that, and I think that is the way that we want to go.

We do not want to have both those trying to do the same thing.

The second point, I think, about the discipline process, which I think is fundamental, and it is to reiterate the point I made before. I suppose the way in which our thinking has developed since we have started is that this issue has got bigger on our horizon; it is clear that this is a major source of, I think, a lack of credibility and confidence in the current system, which I think is damaging to the Police Service as a whole. And I suppose I would say, "Look, I think we need to be bold about this, I think there is a momentum for change, I do not think the answer is tinkering with and patching up the current system, I think you have to go back to first principles, I think you have to look at what is best practice in other fields and see where that is appropriate to apply, and work that way round, rather than seeing how we can patch up the current system".

And I do think there is an opportunity here for bold reform. I think there is a momentum in that direction, and I hope that is an area where you will be able to give a lead.

Sir William Morris: Thank you very much.

Well, that really does take us to the end of the contributions this morning. Can I just on behalf of my colleagues and myself say thanks to the IPCC and everyone concerned with it for the written submissions that we have had, your visit this morning and before, and the evidence that you have given, and the overall contribution that you are making to our work. We are extremely grateful. Thank you both very much.

Mr Wadham: Good luck with your report.

Sir William Morris: Thank you.

We stand adjourned until 2 pm.

11.40 am)
(The short adjournment)
2.00 pm

Skip Navigation \| Accessible

Accessibility About the Inquiry Contacts Search
Home News Schedule Transcripts Evidence Report Links
Transcripts > Independent Police Complaints Commission (08 Jun 04)
QuickSearch See also On this website: Evidence: Independent Police Complaints Commission Transcript: Independent Police Complaints Commission (24 February 2004)	Previous Next	Views Print Accessible Actions Send
	Archive note Important note: This is an archive of the website that was formerly at www.morrisinquiry.gov.uk. It is being hosted on the MPA website for archival purposes only and may contain out-of-date information. Page summary This resource is from the Transcripts section. This section contains a transcript of the public session with Mr N Hardwick and Mr J Wadham of the Independent Police Complaints Commission on 8 June 2004. Sections available here: Transcript of public session: Mr N Hardwick and Mr J Wadham of the Independent Police Complaints Commission Questions by Sir William Morris Questions by Miss Weekes Questions by Sir Anthony Burden Alternative versions This transcript is also available with original line and page numbering. Content Transcript of public session: Mr N Hardwick and Mr J Wadham of the Independent Police Complaints Commission Tuesday, 8 June 2004 10.30 am Sir William Morris: Good morning everyone. Good morning, Mr Hardwick, Mr Wadham, welcome back. Can I first of all thank you both for accepting yet again our invitation to attend the Inquiry and to give us some further evidence, and thank you also for the additional submission that we found extremely helpful. I am sure you will recall the remit of our Inquiry and our method of approach, so I will dispense with some of the formalities here and go straight on to say that following these introductory words I will move straight into the questions. I will lead with a few questions to your good selves followed by my colleagues if they have any supplementary ones, and when we have completed our task in asking the questions we will offer you the opportunity to make a brief closing comment, if you so wish. As before, let me for the record just point out that a transcript of our proceedings this morning is being taken in order to ensure that we have a proper record of all the evidence given by our witnesses, and this will be published on our website shortly following this morning's session. Before I begin, for the benefit of the transcript, Mr Hardwick, Mr Wadham, I wonder if you would mind formally introducing yourselves to the Inquiry yet again. Mr Hardwick: Good morning, Sir Bill, and thank you for the invitation to return. My name is Nick Hardwick and I am the Chairman of the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Mr Wadham: And I am John Wadham, I am the Deputy Chair of the Independent Police Complaints Commission. Sir William Morris: Welcome to you both. Questions by Sir William Morris Mr Hardwick and Wadham, I understand that the secretary to our Inquiry, Amanda Kelly, wrote to you on 5th May setting out the areas in which we are interested in seeking further evidence from you. Just to recap, as I understand it, they were firstly the emerging themes from the IPCC's experience of its first few weeks in operation, and the extent to which it would welcome some form of independence in terms of case management of the investigation of police complaints, grievance and disciplinary matters. Just those two, from me anyway. You very helpfully set out your response to these matters in further written submissions, and it is against that background that we would want to explore with you how these issues and trends are emerging in your first few weeks of operation and any additional evidence that my colleagues and myself deemed useful to aid the Inquiry's work. So let me begin by asking you, firstly, what in fact are the emerging themes from the IPCC's first few weeks of operation by way of your experience? Mr Hardwick: Well, thank you, Sir Bill. Since we last met, the IPCC has become operational on 1st April, and I think, if it is not tempting fate too much, we have made a sound start, but it is still early days. So far we are in the process of conducting two independent investigations: one into a shooting incident in [redacted], and one into a shooting incident here in the Metropolitan Police Service. We are managing nine investigations and supervising a further 75. As well as our investigative work, we have continued to build up our kind of guardianship, our oversight role, developing contact at a local level with forces, professional standards departments, police authorities and with other stakeholders. I would say it is still very early days and so I am cautious about saying what themes have emerged at this point, but a couple of things I would draw your attention to. One area that we had not really anticipated when we last met was the legal advice we obtained on Article 2 of the ECHR, and that is that where there was a suggestion of systematic failure or an allegation of misconduct into a serious case, the investigation needed to have institutional independence, and us managing the investigation would not in itself be enough to ensure that independence, and that if we were not to investigate a matter like that ourselves, an external force would need to be used. And so we have required the use of external forces into incidents more than we had previously anticipated. In some ways, in some of those cases, that is an appropriate thing to do. In other cases, I think there are issues around the benefits of police forces criss-crossing the country, investigating each other, and whether sometimes the external force can bring in the skills and experience that the home force might be able to apply itself. So that has been a problematic area. We are in discussions with ACPO about this. They are getting their own advice and we will have a conference of counsels to try and work out with ACPO a common way forward. The other area is that, as I think I said last time, we had originally hoped to begin our independent investigations by the start of July. In fact we have been able to start those ahead of schedule and, as I said, we have already started two independent investigations into two serious cases. In terms of more general themes, I think one of the things that has been very striking in the cases that we have dealt with so far have been the number of incidents where the mental health of, if you like, the victim, or the person who has been the victim of the incident, has been a factor. And one of the things we will look at in future is the extent to which, to use perhaps a cliche, the Police Service has become a sort of social service of last resort, and why it is that people with these kinds of mental health problems are ending up in police custody and why they are not being dealt with more effectively by other agencies. But when it is the case that people with mental health problems end up in custody, the extent to which the various police services and the officers on the front line have the skills and support they need to deal with matters of that kind. Finally I would say that we have been encouraged by the extent to which, as we have become operational, we have been able to maintain the support of our stakeholders both in the Police Service and those who represent the complainants. Sir William Morris: The numbers you have given us in terms of live and active cases does not of course include what you describe as the legacy of inheritance. Mr Hardwick: No. Sir William Morris: Do you have any anticipated dates about when these might be cleared, the legacy cases? Mr Hardwick: We have about 1,800 legacy cases of various sorts. We hope to have cleared most of those within about a year. Some of them are very complex investigations where the timescale is outside our control, but what we hope to see is a steady decline over the next 12 months in the number of those cases, and I think by the end of a 12-month period we should only be left with a handful. Sir William Morris: Early days, no trends, but any feedback from, if I can describe them as the user groups, like police services or... Mr Hardwick: In terms of feedback from the Police Service, I have been encouraged to the extent by which we have had, and continue to have, a positive reaction. Certainly if we look at the most serious cases where we have been directly involved, there has been a good response from the forces themselves; we have had all the co-operation that we could ask for. One of the things I said to you last time that we would try and do is make a particular effort to keep the officers involved informed of the progress of enquiries. If I could give a couple of examples of a case we are dealing with, an independent investigation into a shooting in [redacted]. We took over that investigation on a Friday. By the Monday our senior investigating officer had met with the officers concerned to explain the process we would follow, to answer any questions they had about our processes and about the IPCC, and I think that was generally well received. And in other parts of the country we have made a particular effort to make sure that the officers involved are aware of our role, that they understand the IPCC, and that – obviously there might be questions about the case we cannot answer, but we can explain about the organisation and about our general approach, and generally that does seem to have been well received. We have also made a particular effort, of course, to maintain regular contact with the families of victims where there has been a death, and again I think that has been appreciated. Sir William Morris: Good. Just on the basis of feedback, information that has been offered to us on one or two visits is the opportunity to have a regional liaison; that has come across as extremely positive and something that police officers have offered to us that they are looking forward to that sort of regional relationship. I do not know whether you have any feedback on that. Mr Hardwick: That is right, I would agree with that. One of the advantages we have over the Police Complaints Authority is that we are regionally based. We have regional officers in Cardiff, Leicester, Manchester and of course here in London, and we have commissioners and teams of investigators and support staff based in those offices, and my colleagues have made a particular effort to maintain contact with forces and other community groups at a regional level. I think that really does help. For instance, with the Professional Standards Departments, we are not just in contact with them when there is a problem; we are maintaining regular contact and getting a feel for how they are operating and gradually building up our capacity to issue our own kind of guidance about how we think things should work. And as part of that also we have maintained contact with police authorities in each force. As our experience and knowledge of individual forces grows, and how the system is operating at the moment develops, we will issue statutory guidance in the autumn, probably around October, and we will do that in a consultative way in discussion with forces and other interested groups. Sir William Morris: Just one last point from me. Early days yet, and I think we all agree on that, but based on inherited experience I note that you are coming to the view, as a commission, that some review of the disciplinary process is desirable, and that is something that in the fullness of time, no doubt, as a commission, you will want to turn your attention to. But in the meantime, you are indicating that you see possible scope for using the fast-track procedure more extensively. I do not know whether you want to offer us any additional information to your written evidence on that? Mr Hardwick: Perhaps I could ask my colleague John Wadham to answer that in a moment, because he is representing the IPCC on the Home Office's review of the disciplinary processes. But, as I said to you, I think, last time we met, my experience in the set-up phase is that in some ways there was a consensus around, if you like, the critique of the current disciplinary rules, in the same way as there had been a consensus around the problems with the previous investigative process. The difference, I think, is that there was a common view about how the investigative process should be reformed, whilst with the disciplinary process, I think, while there may be a common view of the problems, there was not necessarily a common view of the solution. I think since we last met our views have firmed up somewhat. They are still in the process of development, but perhaps I could hand over to John and he could explain a bit more of our thinking on that. Mr Wadham: Thanks, Nick. I think we think that the IPCC is part of the solution in relation to the investigation process, but actually we have not concentrated enough on the discipline process, and that is something that we are taking some time to look at. It is obviously very sensible that the Home Office has initiated a review, because I think we have not done enough research on the history, but as far as we can tell the history of the discipline process seems to be in parallel with the kind of militaristic courts martial, which, of course, is not about modern management practice; and you know better than we do the difficulties that that causes in relation to investigations, the delays. And of course not just for the individual complainants but also for the officers, where we have spent years dealing with things where, in another sensible organisation, management practices which were based on fairness to the employee would resolve these things within days and possibly weeks. So I think we need to move towards that. We are of course concerned not to lose two important parts of the current system: one is that the complainant would have some kind of role, would know what was happening, because of course in relation to normal employment practices the complainant is excluded from the process because it is solely controlled by management; and the second issue is the important one of the public interest being represented. Where a chief police officer or others are reluctant to take disciplinary action then the IPCC, or previously the PCA, can have a role in encouraging et cetera, and that is important and something we do not want to lose. I think we need to design a system way which is more sophisticated, particularly to ensure that officers are protected; that the process is speeded up. Just on a kind of footnote in relation to our evidence, there is a problem about the fast-track process. I think there have been some problems with that. It has not been used as often as it should have been in the past and now the legislation seems to create a difficulty where perhaps it cannot be used at all, and that is very unfortunate. We are in some discussions with the Home Office about whether we can change that because, from our perspective, resolving a discipline matter should be able to be dealt with quickly, and if there are criminal prosecutions perhaps they should take as long as they are going to take but you should not need to have to wait for that process and, you know, there are very many examples where perhaps changing that would make a real difference. I think we have sorted out, or we are in the process of sorting out the investigation stage, and now we have got to look at the discipline stage, and I think we would very much welcome any recommendations you have about the direction that that should take so that that can influence our approach and obviously the Home Office's approach. Sir William Morris: There is a view emerging, I think, that fast-track is fine insofar as it goes, but you need more than well over 50 per cent certainty, because, if along the process there is any reason for withdrawal, then that is it, you have lost your chance, because double jeopardy comes in and you cannot start on another track. You cannot have fast-track and slow track; you have to make a choice. Mr Wadham: No, exactly. I think the solution needs to be more radical than the fast-track process. In ordinary employment situations, if someone is accused of something which is a disciplinary matter as well as potentially a criminal offence, then the disciplinary matter can be dealt with quickly, and if the person then subsequently is prosecuted, there is no reason why the disciplinary matter should affect that criminal prosecution, so that employers can deal with things quickly. It is not just about the efficiency in relation to managers, it is also about the individual police officers, because one of the things that shocked me, I think, in the time that I have been at the IPCC is processes where investigations take a long time – and we hope to do something about that – then consideration by the Crown Prosecution Service takes a long time, criminal prosecutions then occur, often those do not succeed, or individuals are not convicted, whether they should or should not be, and of course you then have to look at the discipline process at the end. So the police officer as well as the member of the public who may have made a complaint is having to wait years for something and that creates difficulties, and I think we need to work backwards and say, "Look, if there is a discipline matter, then unless that is going to prejudice the criminal process that should be dealt with quickly". And so I think there are directions in which we would want to go, and I hope that your Inquiry, Sir Bill, will make a difference. Sir William Morris: Thank you very much. Could I invite Miss Weekes to put a few questions to you. Questions by Miss Weekes Miss Weekes: Can I, as it is convenient, continue on the line of disciplinary matters, because I have got a few questions to raise now that we are much clearer ourselves about the issues in relation to the conduct of disciplinary hearings for either of you, but it may well be that John Wadham may want to continue on this vein. The present state of conduct of disciplinary hearings from the majority of witnesses who have come before us indicate that they are far too legalistic, lawyers on the defence side constantly raise abuse of process and other legal challenges that take up quite a lot of time. They are run far too much like strict evidential criminal proceedings. So I wonder whether you have any views – I know that you are looking at this at the moment but it is a very important area – I wonder whether you have any views as to whether we 15 could sensibly consider streamlining the conduct of disciplinary hearings, because we are going to be stuck with the regulations for a while to come; it is going to take some time to change those regulations; they are not going to happen overnight. So if I can just have your comments, from either of you, about the conduct of the proceedings themselves. Mr Wadham: Perhaps I could start. I think the first thing is that the commission does not have a settled view on everything yet, but I think there is no doubt that there is a consensus that the current system is not working; that, in a sense, the paraphernalia of the discipline process seems to be modelled on the criminal process, and although the IPCC is committed to ensuring that there is a fair system for police officers and their rights are respected, nevertheless the issues that ordinarily – the protections and safeguards that are necessary in the criminal process do not need to be available to officers. For instance, the issue of adverse inferences and the right to silence is very strange in the employment context. We have mentioned already the fast-track process. Abuse of process ordinarily would not have a place in the employment context in relation to the gathering of evidence. What we want to do, I think, is to move closer to an employment ACAS kind of model, without losing the important protections that officers should have. That will require changes in the law and in the regulations, and we would want to see those changes, and we want to participate in that. And I hope, as I said, that your Inquiry can make a difference in ensuring that that process begins. In answer to the second part of the question, which is what we do in the meantime, I think that is more difficult, because obviously police officers, their Federation representatives and lawyers, are quite likely to want to insist on the rights that they currently have. I think we would like to look in more detail about what can be done within the current system, but I think it is not easy to see obvious changes without changes to the rules and the regulations. For instance, a couple of changes that were made in 1999, the double jeopardy change and the change in relation to the standard of proof from beyond reasonable doubt to the civil standard, do not seem to have made as much difference as some people who were urging those changes thought they would have. Miss Weekes: Indeed, it seems to have been operating on a sliding scale which is even worse. Mr Wadham: Yes, there are some complicated legal arguments. But I think you started your question in relation to the involvement of lawyers, and I think it has got over-legalistic, there have been too many lawyers, and I do not think that has always served the officers' interests. People who have had disciplinary or criminal processes hanging over them for years, they are not able to make any headway in terms of promotion, then sometimes they are suspended: the consequences are that nothing happens at the end of it, so the complainant is not satisfied. I think we need to change this process and we need to do so as quickly as possible. That is what we will be urging, I think, in relation to the Home Office. But I do not know what the answers are in the short-term, I am afraid. Mr Hardwick: Can I just add something very briefly to that. I think some of it is to do with, if you like, processes and procedures and regulations, but some of it is also to do with the culture in which the disciplinary processes operate. This may be a bit of a generalisation, but if one looks at ordinary civilian employment disciplinary processes, when you are dealing with the lower levels of misconduct, the stated purpose of the exercise is not simply to punish the offender, but it is to find methods of improving and preventing, if you like, the misconduct or the error happening again. My observation is – still I feel something of an outsider to the police system – the emphasis and the culture is very much on the punishment and the penalty; it is not on improvement. It seems to me that this is something the forces and police authorities could look at without trying to change the culture in which the disciplinary process is operating. Some of that is around rewarding good behaviour, so that when officers do co-operate with the process, when they are prepared to say, "Yes, in hindsight, I did make a mistake there; I did get that wrong", that they do not then feel that the whole weight of the system comes crashing down on them, but that where they show a willingness to learn from their mistakes and to change their behaviour, that that is encouraged and supported and then does not become simply further ammunition for them to be punished. So I think some of those sort of cultural changes that need to be made at the top I think would be better, because it seems to me that one of the things that is necessary in order to change the system is that there has to be some sort of degree of trust in the motives of the people doing it. The Police Federation and others will need to feel – part of the reason they take the adversarial approach that they do, I am sure, is because they do not trust the system, and therefore you get yourself into a vicious circle. If we could build some trust back into the system. The point, certainly for the lower level issues, is around improvement and prevention; that might move some way in the right direction, I think. Miss Weekes: Just one final point on the disciplinary. One significant block to the movement of a disciplinary case is the right of the officer to remain silent. I put it that way because you will both know – and I think John Wadham has already said it – that in ordinary employment law, of course, the whole point of dealing with an issue of conduct is that the manager/employer is able to say, "Perhaps you can help me with what went wrong here; what is your explanation?" If it is given on day one then immediately one has the ability to move to a resolution. Where you have this legal approach which the officers are entitled to take advantage of, that they can remain silent, the Department of Professional Standards have no power to demand an explanation for some time, particularly when the officer goes sick. So we might want to consider – and I would welcome both your views – on a reform basis for later a change in the statute that requires officers to give an explanation. Mr Hardwick: We would agree with that. I think our view is that it may be a different matter where an officer faces criminal proceedings, but aside from that I have not heard any convincing explanation why an officer should not have to give an account of their actions while they were on duty, in the same way as any other employer. I have not heard any, I think, persuasive argument why that should not be the case. Indeed, I think sometimes that would be in the officer's interest to do, because they would be able to give an explanation where one is possible. But also sometimes I think that would really help narrow the focus of any subsequent inquiry. I am aware, for instance, not in cases that we have been involved in, where we have had good support from the officers involved, who have been willing to give us early accounts of what has happened, and therefore has enabled us at an early stage to focus down on the key issues. But I am aware of previous cases, under the old system, where, for instance, there has been a shooting, where the officers actually involved in the incident, including those wide in the outer cordon, have not been 21 willing to give an account of what happened. Therefore when the inquiry starts it has got to inevitably take a very broad brush approach before it can focus down onto the key issues. That delays things. That puts people who were perhaps on the periphery, with no suggestion, it later turns out, of any wrongdoing, somehow caught in the net of the inquiry. I think it would be in everybody's interest if there was a much greater obligation for people to give an account of the actions they took while they were on duty. Miss Weekes: You have correctly emphasised that criminal proceedings are quite different. Mr Hardwick: Yes. Mr Wadham: Just to follow that, I would find it bizarre if my boss, Nick Hardwick, was not able to ask me, "Where were you on 8th June, at 11 o'clock, and what were you doing, and why did you so badly mishandle your evidence at the Morris Inquiry?", or whatever else he was to say. So I do find that strange. As a human rights lawyer, there is no justification for this from the European Convention on Human Rights or anywhere else. There is, of course, in the context of criminal law, but there is not, and I do not think there should be, in relation to employment issues. Miss Weekes: Can I move on to quite another important area, and it is the whole question of the high profile cases. I know that you will know that part of our terms of reference is to look at high profile cases, and I reminded myself of the statutory basis of your powers to supervise, manage and to investigate, and for any authority who considers that there are exceptional circumstances, or indeed the gravity of the subject matter, can ask you to investigate. There are within the Met high profile cases, which we have looked at, and cases of some sensitivity. Some of those cases involve discrimination, and race is high on the agenda for how the Met often has a difficulty with dealing with issues which relate to who they call visible ethnic minority officers; black, Asian or others. I just wonder whether you are beginning to have a feel for how you will view your statutory guidance about those cases, because we have heard evidence which gives us some concern that these cases are not always being handled effectively at a local level. Officers are oversensitive about how they manage, how they deal with conduct issues; they tend to go up the hierarchy far too quickly. Certainly with the case of Superintendent Ali Dizaei, the evidence he gave yesterday is, "Well, I was disproportionately investigated because of my race". Just generally, do you have any comments about management of those types of cases? I am not going into the detail of Ali Dizaei, but I use it as an example only. Mr Hardwick: I think we do, yes. First of all, I think they go to the heart of our responsibilities, because when we look at our own approach on an individual case, we would consider not only, if you like, the gravity of the incident in terms of its sort of impact on an individual, the injury or death of an individual, but also its effect on public and police confidence. And there is no doubt in my mind that some of the cases where race has been an issue have had a huge impact on both public confidence and on police confidence. And that would certainly be a very significant factor in determining our own involvement. To some extent, of course, our ability to be involved will depend on the resources that we have, and we are in discussions with the Home Office about a growth in our resources. We want to get to the state where we can do about 200 investigations a year. If we were doing that, that would enable us to do, for instance, the 100 or so cases each year where there has been a death following police contact. But the other, if you like, 100 that we have we would try and use in a thematic way, either to look across the board that there is a real concern about cases involving race right across the board, right across all forces, and we will take in some of the most serious of those and investigate, or we might say, "Look, all the evidence we are getting from our stakeholders, from the force itself, is that this particular force has a difficulty with these kinds of issues so we will go in and look at those and undertake those investigations ourselves". If we can increase our capacity then we have an ability to get directly involved. But also certainly in terms of the cases that we supervise, the lower levels of involvement, race will be a very significant factor for us, because there is no doubt – if you look at some of the high profile cases, I think, regardless of the merits of the case itself, regardless of the rights or wrongs of the case itself, there is no doubt that those cases have had a very serious impact on public confidence and on police confidence itself. Without going into the details – in the Dizaei case, for instance. Miss Weekes: Or Virdi. Mr Hardwick: Or Virdi. I have been struck within the Metropolitan Police Service by how big an issue it is and how much that case has undermined confidence in the whole system. Whatever view people take on that case, often on partial information, whatever view they take, there is no doubt it has damaged the (inaudible) of the investigative and disciplinary processes, and that would be a very strong reason for our involvement, and I think it would be a major improvement. Part of the sort of strategy for this, something I hope we will be able to do, is take your own recommendations on these points and then have a long-term ability to follow those through. So what I would expect will be happening is that you will be making recommendations about how these things are dealt with and we then, hopefully over the longer term, will have the capacity to pursue those and to make sure they are being implemented. So from that point of view this Inquiry has been very productive for us. Miss Weekes: A number of witnesses are saying to us, "Well, we really would rather like an independent person to have a look at some point at the sensitive investigations to see that things are going okay". I am rather anxious to look at what we have already got to see whether you can improve what you have got, because if you involve too many independent other persons one might get more confusion and imbalance than what you have got. I looked again at your ability to look at these cases. What do you say of their requests for an independent person in these types of cases? Mr Hardwick: Well, I do think there is a danger about too many people getting involved, and therefore it not being clear-cut where the buck stops, which I think would be a problem. I hope that we will be able to meet some of those concerns through our supervisory role, because, in a sense, when we do supervise a case, what we are doing – we are not conducting the investigation itself, but we are having oversight, we are asking the kind of critical questions at key times in an independent way, and ultimately we can say, "Look, we are not happy with the conclusion of this". And so I think our supervisory role does, if you like, provide the independent element of oversight or case management into cases of that nature, or could do, and I think that is something we would want to build on and develop. And if we were supervising a case and there was an independent element, and there was a difference of view, for instance, I think that would start to get very complicated and might actually then add to the delays and bureaucracy in the system, which nobody wants. Mr Wadham: One of the things that the Police Complaints Authority did not have was the ability to call into conduct matters that did not involve complaints from members of the public. We have that. I think there has been a cultural change with the police because I think they are now beginning to refer cases – or contact us and say, "Do you think you should supervise this case?" or, "What do you think your involvement in this case should be?". And we have not had to call in cases in a direct way as a result of that power, so that is important. A lot of the examples that people talk about in relation to the failure of the system have been cases that did not necessarily start out with a complaint from a member of the public, or not an official complaint, and there are often issues between officers or issues of discipline. We are now in a position to ensure that those are supervised by us, and in some cases could be managed by us, or we could independently investigate them. So I think we have the powers and I think we can use those, but it is early days because, of course, perhaps in the longer term we will be able to demonstrate that that does make a difference; we hope so. But as Nick suggested, it is very difficult to see how you add on yet another independent element. But we have no problem with officers, whether they are being subject to investigations, or other officers or anyone else contacting us saying, "This is one you should look at, you should call this one in", because we have the power to do that and we could then actually provide that independent element. We could provide it both in terms of ensuring that the investigation is thorough and effective, but also I hope to ensure that the investigation is proportionate and that people concentrate on what the terms of reference are about and focus on what the real issue is rather than investigating everything that may or may not be connected. I hope we can do what is necessary. The proof of the pudding is whether we deliver. Miss Weekes: I am grateful for those encouraging comments. Just moving on to accountability, we welcome the right of appeal to every member of the public who feels dissatisfied with their complaint at whatever stage the complaint is. It is interesting to note – and I am not suggesting that it should be there, but it is not there – that an officer who has gone through disciplinary proceedings or an investigation who feels justifiably cross and upset at the decision to investigate, the method, the amount of money spent, the time spent, does not have a right of appeal to anybody within the statutory guidelines. Let us take, for example, Gurpal Virdi or Ali Dizaei as a classic example. If, halfway through their investigation, they have become understandably and correctly disgruntled on a proper basis that the conduct of the investigation was quite wrong, or against acceptable police practice, it might be helpful that they could appeal to a body like yourselves. In a way, perhaps, your supervisory role does take that into account, but move it forward. If at the end of an investigation it all goes completely wrong, and unfortunately things do go wrong and will still go wrong, a number of officers have said that the trouble is we do not have any comeback, that officer gets promoted through the ranks and nobody is accountable, we cannot complain about the wrong done to us. Any comments? Mr Wadham: I think the first thing is that if an investigation is being carried out by officers in a force in relation to another officer, as I said earlier, anyone can ask us to intervene in that process, we can supervise that investigation, we could manage that investigation or we could take over the investigation ourselves, and we can do that at any point, halfway through – whether in fact in any particular case it would be good to do it halfway through, but we could do so. So officers, I think, in the future are now in the position that they can actually call – they cannot call us in, but they can ask us, as could a member of the public, as could a particular police force. So that is an added safeguard. The second thing, of course – and this has happened – is that where the investigating officers are accused of misconduct themselves, then again that is an issue that we can investigate. So if there are allegations of misconduct with the investigators, and there have been in some of the cases you mentioned, then that can be investigated, and of course we can supervise, manage or independently investigate that. So I think there is a degree of accountability in the new system that there was not in the past, and I hope that we can sensibly exercise those powers. In relation to the discipline process, of course, there are all the appeal mechanisms that exist for officers, so I am not so concerned about that issue. I think accountability, in a case where we have been involved, or perhaps where we have failed to be involved, is down to us at that stage. So I am not saying that more cannot be done, and we perhaps need to look at practice perhaps on the basis of your recommendations, but I think we have moved a long way towards a better system for ensuring more effective and more efficient and proportionate investigations. Mr Hardwick: If I could just very briefly add to that. I do think also we have got to be conscious of the need to keep the system proportionate and timely, and I think at some point you have to draw a line and be able to say, "Look, this is as far as we have gone with this." I think if there was evidence of misconduct or allegations of misconduct on the part of investigating officers then of course that would need to be dealt with. But I think you have got to be able – you can imagine yourself getting into a situation where the original allegation is not upheld so there is an investigation into the investigating officers, then there is an investigation into the people investigating the investigating officers. There could be no end to it, so you have to be able to draw lines round it at some point, I think, and you have to make sure that there is a system that is robust and cannot be abused by people throwing up sort of red herrings or false allegations. You have got to get a balance in there, I think. Miss Weekes: And finally, speed of investigations. I know that you have kindly commented about whether or not you could oversee or take into account an independent case manager, and if I might say, I agree with you about that, that it ought not to be you because you are part of investigating cases. But can I just, very briefly, deal with the principle, because the practicalities of this would need to be worked out. Where this particular case manager sits and to whom he will be responsible is another issue. You will both be extremely familiar with the way criminal cases are fixed and case managed; you will be familiar with how employment law cases are fixed and case managed. It seems to me not impossible to have case management of disciplinary cases, complaint cases, so that someone, somewhere, is responsible for bringing the parties together to ensure that the case moves, applications for adjournments, are considered on a proper basis, applications for sick leave are considered on a proper basis, disclosure is considered on a proper basis, and the fixing of cases is considered on a proper basis. Just that in principle. Mr Wadham: There are two parts of the case management. I think we are suggesting that we are able to deal with the case management of the investigation stage, but I think there is a real virtue in having case management once the investigation is over. I would not want it to be – we have already talked about being overly legalistic; I would not want it to get into difficulties. But I think the reforms in the civil process, the Woolf Report, have recommended that you can make a difference to speeding cases up, and I think that case management in the criminal process works well as well. Actually, as soon as the disciplinary tribunal is seized of a matter, then I think they should be in control of the running of it so that we can make sure that things speed up, decisions about adjournment, decisions about disclosure, decisions about orchestrating or choreography of the process, and that is more likely to mean that it would come to a conclusion quickly. We have not given much thought to how that should work, but we are hoping that you can help us. Miss Weekes: I think that person ought to be legally qualified so that they can be judicially reviewed. Mr Wadham: As a lawyer, I would have to agree with that. Miss Weekes: Do you have any comments to make on case management? Mr Hardwick: I agree with what John said here. I think it goes back on to the general theme we have talked about around the disciplinary process, where it seems to me that the starting point ideally should not be the current system and how do we patch it up, but I think we should be looking at what is best practice in ordinary civilian employment matters and what of that is applicable to the Police Service. There are bound to be some elements because of the police's special powers and responsibilities, and in some cases they need protection, the system does need to be different. I think we ought to be looking at best practice in other jurisdictions, other employment situations, and trying to apply that to the Police Service. I think, as I said before, both in terms of regulation and procedure, and in terms of the culture and style almost of the way in which these things are done, much of this is applicable and transferrable and that ought to be done. Miss Weekes: Thank you. Sir William Morris: Thank you very much indeed. I know Sir Anthony has got one or two points he wants to explore with you. Questions by Sir Anthony Burden Sir Anthony Burden: I would like to pursue that point in more detail, if I may, because I actually think there is a big gap ahead of this stage that we have been discussing and that is the management of cases during the investigation. The main points that concern me boil down to delays, which we have dealt with; poor use of suspension and the extended suspension of officers, and we are dealing in the Metropolitan Police with two who have been suspended for seven and a half years; the setting of dates for hearings and the managing of that process through; and the dealing disproportionately with black and minority staff. If I may just refer to a synopsis that has been prepared in the office for me – because not being a lawyer, trying to digest 750 pages of a piece of statute is not my idea of fun – about the general duties of police authorities. You will be very familiar with this, I know. But it seems to me that Section 15 of the new Act really, as it says there, is in effect a reincarnation of Section 77 of the old Act, so there is nothing new in that; the wording is as loose as it was and open to interpretation, I guess, by the Police Authority as to how robust they are in managing the process. But having had the opportunity to look at some suggestive protocol on the way that this is to be interpreted, there is a lot of reference to the Police Service notifying police authorities, to providing information, to a police authority being available to provide advice, to manage and monitor expenditure on settling cases, but precious little about holding people to account and to having true oversight of what is obviously going wrong at the moment in terms of delays, suspension, setting of dates for hearings, and therefore the whole thing, as you have both referred to, just drags on and on and on and confidence goes down the drain as a consequence of that. I really am looking for something which does hold the Directorate of Professional Standards to account in relation to the way it does its business, and for somebody to say, "I am sorry, but the delay which is beginning to build in this case is absolutely unacceptable". That is in the day-to-day case management; it is not about 3 monthly or 6 monthly reviews; it is actually about day-to-day management. Some would argue, well, surely it ought to be the person who is in charge of the department's responsibility to do that, but if it is not being done effectively, can I just seek your views as to the role you currently have, under the not particularly distinguished legislation that you are having to work within, how you might see your role building in relation to that, and what you would insist ought to be done by the Directorate of Professional Standards to manage its business better? Mr Hardwick: I think we do have a contribution to make in that area. First of all, I think when one considers the role of the Police Authority in discipline and conduct matters, I think that does need to be treated with a degree of caution. It does seem to me that there is a potential problem with, if you like – particularly if the accountability generally of a police force to a police authority for operational matters is increased, it seems to me a safeguard in that process is that conduct issues are dealt with separately, and ultimately a sort of fall back position for a police officer asked to do anything improper is that I am not accountable to you for my conduct. So I would put in that caveat. Having said that, in the set-up phase of the IPCC I went round to every police force and practically in all of those met with members of the Police Authority for Professional Standards Committee, and it was very striking the difference in their approach. The best ones were doing exactly what you said; they would be meeting regularly, they would be getting a list, by reference number, of all the cases, what stage they were at, how long they were taking to be dealt with. I saw police authorities giving the head of Professional Standards Department a very tough time about why delays were there on a particular case, what was being done about it, what had gone wrong, and also I think the force as much as the Police Authority, a very kind of direct involvement in looking at the handling of particular cases and how they were being dealt with, without actually getting into, if you like, deciding on the case, dealing with the conduct matters itself, but holding that force to account for its efficiency of the process. On the other hand, I saw some which were frankly that the Police Authority was kept very much at arm's length, they were given a few hand-picked files to look at once a quarter and that was pretty much it, really, and there was not an effective process. I think there are two things that we could do to help police authorities in their role. First of all, we will soon be in a position to provide them with the kind of data about the performance of their force in these areas as compared with other comparable forces, so I think we can really give people hard evidence for holding their force to account. But also I hope we will have the kind of level of informal contact with the police authorities so that we both have a sort of common picture of what is going on and what is working well and what is not. The second thing I hope we are going to be able to do is in a more systematic way than I have described is identify the forces where the best practice is happening, and then produce guidance in conjunction with the APA for police authorities about what is best practice. Although the network is working a lot better now, I have often been struck by how unaware Police Authority members might be in one force about what their colleagues are doing in a neighbouring force. I think that is improving and I know the APA are looking at this very seriously. I have a good relationship with them. But I think we can add some real value there trying to identify and promote best practice in conjunction with the APA so that police authorities are better able to do precisely what you suggested. Sometimes I think they are not very clear about what they can ask for; you know, it is a very difficult task for them, and I think it is quite easy for them to be put off if that is what the force tries to do. So I would like to see a strengthened hierarchy. I think that is a key part of our partnership with police authorities. Sir Anthony Burden: So you would see the overall solution to this in strengthening the role of police authorities by giving them better management data, by spreading best practice? Mr Hardwick: Yes. Sir Anthony Burden: But you very firmly see it as their responsibility, not a new body or – Mr Hardwick: No, I do see that. We have talked about this before, you can have too many bodies doing this, and, as I say, I think you do need to make a distinction between the authority's role, if you like, for the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, which I think is proper, and their role actually, if you like, in determining conduct matters which I think does cause me more problems. But I think if you can maintain that distinction, I think that is an area which is, as I say, not necessarily something which is completely new, but actually if we could simply bring all forces up to the standard of the best practice that is happening now, I think that would be a very big change. Mr Wadham: The contribution I was going to make is, actually, do they really need any more powers to do precisely what you are asking them to do, because I do not think they do. Sir Anthony Burden: No. Mr Wadham: And like Nick, I have been around at least half of the country and met some of the police authorities, and some of them are dedicated to making a difference, and in some places it is more of a backwater, and perhaps the changes that you may recommend, and the work that the IPCC is doing, will enable, empower Police Authority members in the discipline subcommittees to actually ensure that they are actually responsible and they take control. I think that is something that we hope is beginning to happen and we would like to see more of it. I am not sure it needs more powers or legislation; I think that is something that they could do tomorrow, and perhaps that is something that they should do. Sir Anthony Burden: Yes. Finally, can I just deal with the issue of the Taylor Report, and thank you, once again in your initial submission you refer to your support for the Taylor recommendations. I can only speak personally. I get a sense, as I talk to people, that that report is not as widely understood – the recommendations are not as widely accepted in terms of day-to-day management of complaints at the moment as I would have expected them to be, and therefore the Taylor Report recommendations are not actually kicking in in relation to the way that cases are being managed. Superintendent Dizaei referred yesterday to his inquiry, saying it was a train that once it started rolling nothing was going to stop it. The Taylor Report recommendations would have stopped it. Mr Hardwick: Yes, we have certainly tried to ensure that we have had Bill Taylor in actually doing training sessions for our commissioners on precisely those issues, and we are looking very hard in terms of our own practice about complying with his recommendations about tighter terms of reference, about strategic management of cases. And I think the train analogy is a good one. I think one of the kind of difficulties with the system at the moment is that it is a nonstop train; once you decide to get on, you cannot get off until the train reaches its destination. So if you get on at Euston, the train does not stop till it gets to Glasgow and that is it. One of the things that we have been able to do in the new system is we have developed the practice of sending in assessors to cases at an early stage, who are normally our SIOs – in fact all our SIOs are experienced former police investigators. One of the things that means is that when the commissioners come to make a decision on that case about how we are going to investigate it we have got information from the scene, from our own people, about what the issues are. And so actually we have been able to downgrade some inquiries and say, "Actually, look, there is nothing in this for us", and when you have an initial look, it is clear that there is not a serious matter of misconduct here or a serious matter of public concern. We can leave it to the force to deal with. Whereas I think in the old system, because you did not have, if you like, that on the spot reporting from our own people, it would be much more likely that that would have been ramped up the scale and then the whole process would have kicked in and people would not have been able to get off the train. One of the ways we want to husband our very scarce resources is to be able to, if you like, ramp things up or down according to the information we are getting about the seriousness of a matter. Bill Taylor's recommendations are a significant sort of foundation for how we are going to operate, and we certainly want to try and promote that to other forces, and we have been doing that in terms of things like the (inaudible) terms of reference. Sir Anthony Burden: In the visits you are both making and your regional staff, you are also looking, are you, to ensure that the partners of professional standards are implementing the Taylor recommendations on a day-to-day basis? I think that is where I would sense there is a gap in the understanding at the moment. Mr Hardwick: We have started to do that and where we are in that process is that we had Bill Taylor doing a day's training for our commissioners at the end of May, and so from that point we are taking this forward now to a much more operational level about our interactions with the departments of professional standards. So we are very early days yet, but for me personally it is very high on my list of priorities in terms of the things I have read so far that have made an impression on me about changes, I think that is a key document and I am personally very committed to carrying out the recommendations that are in it. Sir Anthony Burden: Thank you very much. Miss Weekes: It is a very small request. You have both mentioned that in your trips around the country you have spotted some good practice of police authorities supervising complaints. I would be very grateful for just a list of those police authorities, if you can send them in. Mr Hardwick: Okay. We will see what we can do about that. Miss Weekes: I am grateful. Thank you very much. Sir William Morris: Mr Hardwick, Mr Wadham, thank you very much indeed. We have come to the end of the questions that we wanted to seek your further clarification on and we are grateful. But I did say at the introductory stage of our session this morning that you would have not quite the last word but a chance to make any closing comments that you wish. If either of you wish to offer that, then we would like to hear it. Mr Hardwick: Well, perhaps to reiterate two points that I think have emerged from our discussion so far. One is about the role of the IPCC. I think that we have made a sound start; I think that is acknowledged. It is early days yet. What I say is we are very keen to work in partnership with police authorities in the way that we develop our role, and I think it is important that that concept of partnership – so we are not both trying to do the same thing, but we both recognise distinct roles that are complementary, and I think we are on track to developing that, and I think that is the way that we want to go. We do not want to have both those trying to do the same thing. The second point, I think, about the discipline process, which I think is fundamental, and it is to reiterate the point I made before. I suppose the way in which our thinking has developed since we have started is that this issue has got bigger on our horizon; it is clear that this is a major source of, I think, a lack of credibility and confidence in the current system, which I think is damaging to the Police Service as a whole. And I suppose I would say, "Look, I think we need to be bold about this, I think there is a momentum for change, I do not think the answer is tinkering with and patching up the current system, I think you have to go back to first principles, I think you have to look at what is best practice in other fields and see where that is appropriate to apply, and work that way round, rather than seeing how we can patch up the current system". And I do think there is an opportunity here for bold reform. I think there is a momentum in that direction, and I hope that is an area where you will be able to give a lead. Sir William Morris: Thank you very much. Well, that really does take us to the end of the contributions this morning. Can I just on behalf of my colleagues and myself say thanks to the IPCC and everyone concerned with it for the written submissions that we have had, your visit this morning and before, and the evidence that you have given, and the overall contribution that you are making to our work. We are extremely grateful. Thank you both very much. Mr Wadham: Good luck with your report. Sir William Morris: Thank you. We stand adjourned until 2 pm. 11.40 am) (The short adjournment) 2.00 pm Internal links On this website: Evidence: Independent Police Complaints Commission Evidence provided by and documents referred to by Mr N Hardwick of the Independent Police Complaints Commission in his appearance at the Inquiry. Transcript: Independent Police Complaints Commission (24 February 2004) The full transcript of the first public session with Mr N Hardwick, Mr John Tate and Ms Jennifer Douglas Todd of the Independent Police Complaints Commission, held at 3.30pm on 24 February 2004.
	Previous Next
Transcripts > Independent Police Complaints Commission (08 Jun 04)
© Copyright 2004, The Morris Inquiry. Standards compliant HTML. Designed and maintained by Netfundi